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PROLOGUE 
In the 1974 book The Fourth World: An Indian Reality, George 
Manuel1 and Michael Posluns2 present a memoir of Manuel’s life to 
 
* S.J.D. Candidate (Faculty of Law, University of Toronto). This Article draws upon 
and forms part of my larger doctoral research examining the intersection of racialized 
migrants, Indigenous peoples and nations, Indigenous legal traditions, Aboriginal law, 
immigration law and the Canadian state. For their invaluable comments and suggestions 
on this paper and the related doctoral work, I would like to thank: Michael Fakhri, Darlene 
Johnston, Dawnis Kennedy, Audrey Macklin, Lee Maracle, Meghan Marcil, Shiri 
Pasternak, Michael Posluns, Kerry Rittich, Kim Stanton, Sujith Xavier, and Peer 
Zumbansen.  Also to the staff and editors of the ORIL for their hard work, especially 
Samantha Benton and Taylor Funk. The responsibility for all errors is my own. 
1 Born in 1921 as a member of the Shuswap Nation (in the B.C. interior), Manuel was a 
First Nations and Indigenous activist, leader, elected head of the North American Indian 
Brotherhood, leader of the National Indian Brotherhood (precursor to the Assembly of 
First Nations), president of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and President of the 
Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs. He died in 1989. Biography of George Manuel, 
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that date, interwoven with a description of the traditions, conditions, 
and struggles of Indigenous peoples in Canada and around the world. 
In the acknowledgements of the book, Manuel thanks Mbutu 
Milando, First Secretary and later High Commissioner of the 
Tanzanian High Commission in Ottawa, “who first suggested to me 
the concept and nature of the Fourth World—an idea that grew into a 
framework for much of my own thought.”3 Among others, Manuel 
also thanks Marie Smallface Marule (Blackfoot), former secretary-
treasurer of the National Indian Brotherhood, who “was also the first 
person to be able to show me, from direct and personal experience, 
the close relationship and common bonds between our own condition 
as Indian people, and the struggles of other aboriginal peoples and the 
nations of the Third World.”4 In The Fourth World, Manuel 
 
UNION OF BC INDIAN CHIEFS, http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/about/george.htm (last visited Mar. 
5, 2012). Among many other accomplishments, he was the driving force behind the 
founding of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. See Douglas Sanders, The 
Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP 
FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS Document no. 29 (1980). Contrary to some interpretations, 
which do not appear consistent with the text, Manuel and Posluns clearly did not utilize 
this term in a derogatory or disempowering manner. Cf. Dianne Otto, A Question of Law 
or Politics? Indigenous Claims to Sovereignty in Australia, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & 
COM. 65, 83 & 102 (1995). Otto’s devaluing of the term due to the potential for further 
stigmatization seems similarly unwarranted, especially given her otherwise uncritical 
acceptance of the term “Third World.” Id. 
2 Michael Posluns “is a journalist and researcher . . . Posluns has conducted research, 
written reports, briefs and monographs on behalf of and about First Nations in Canada and 
the United States.” He has been parliamentary adviser to many bodies, including the 
National Indian Brotherhood, the Assembly of First Nations, and the Dene Nation. 
Inventory of the Michael Posluns Fonds, YORK UNIVERSITY, http://archivesfa.library 
.yorku.ca/fonds/ON00370-f0000382.htm (last updated May 6, 2005). 
3 GEORGE MANUEL & MICHAEL POSLUNS, THE FOURTH WORLD: AN INDIAN REALITY 
(1974) at xvi (Milando is described as “the first diplomat to welcome a closer relationship 
with the Indian people through the National Indian Brotherhood.”). Milando reportedly 
told his friend, Manuel, that “We are called ‘the Third World’” and further that “When the 
Indian peoples come into their own, that will be the Fourth World.” Id. at 5. As described 
in the Author’s Note, this book is “a story told entirely in the voice of one man [that] is the 
work of two authors” who “should like to think that the dialogue from which that voice 
arose is in itself a sign of the Fourth World” Id. Given this single voice, references in the 
body of this article to the book’s author refer to Manuel alone. For an account of some of 
Manuel’s political and international organizing work, as well as the rise of (and some 
fractures within) the Fourth World project, see Sanders, supra note 1. For a recent review 
of international Indigenous activism, including the Fourth World concept, in the context of 
a book-length interrogation of the notion and strategies of Indigenous development, see 
KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS, 
CULTURE, STRATEGY 49–52 (2010). 
4 MANUEL & POSLUNS, supra note 3, at xv. Marule had volunteered with CUSO in the 
newly decolonized state of Zambia for four years where she also met a member of the 
African National Congress who later became her husband, and was inspired by these 
experiences to draw connections between the Third and Fourth Worlds (Conversation with 
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anecdotally and programmatically sets out contemporary challenges 
facing Indigenous peoples and some responses to these challenges. 
Manuel does so by describing a common understanding of the 
universe and threatened worldview, stemming from a common 
attachment to the land, which he distinguishes from the First World 
and the experience of the decolonizing Third World at that time.5 
Drawing inspiration from the teachings of his grandfather, Manuel 
emphasizes the fact of Indigenous peoples’ survival around the world 
and the potential for more than mere survival in the future: 
The Fourth World is a vision of the future history of North America 
and of the Indian peoples. The two histories are inseparable. It has 
been the insistence on the separation of the people from the land 
that has characterized much of recent history. It is this same 
insistence that has prevented European North Americans from 
developing their own identity in terms of the land so that they can 
be happy and secure in the knowledge of that identity.6 
Manuel’s synthesis of a Fourth World perspective stems from a 
lifetime of political activism and observations of a common 
experience of colonialism, dispossession, and attempted assimilation 
(or termination as it was called in the United States). This common 
experience is complemented by a wide variety of Indigenous legal 
orders, which do not receive the recognition they deserve nationally 
 
Michael Posluns). Marule is now President of Red Crow Community College (online: 
http://imap.ammsa.com/node/11593). 
5 MANUEL & POSLUNS, supra note 3, at 5–6 (Manuel notes the Third World strategy 
including the fact that “it reacts to Western political concepts . . . while struggling to 
imitate them”). 
6 Id. at 11–12. Although too numerous to discuss completely here, Manuel’s Fourth 
World thesis stems from an emphasis upon: spiritual relationships with the land, the 
awareness of ecological disaster and the social commodities of land, water, and air. Id. at 
11; the use of story-telling for “moral teaching” and “practical instruction.” Id. at 37; the 
central notion and practice of giving as the foundation of Fourth World social and 
economic citizenship (the “whole foundation of our society . . . is summed up in one word: 
giving”). Id. at 41; the importance, even when there was “nothing to give,” of doing 
something “to make yourself a part of the household where you were a guest.” Id. at 42 (as 
opposed, perhaps, to the alienating theory of labor that creates exclusion through 
individual property); the connection between spiritual and material power. Id. at 43; and, 
the significance and practice of giving as extended to the entire continent of aboriginal 
peoples. Id. at 44. See also JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION 351–
62 (2010) (showing the use of stories as cases in ILT and the story of Mandamin/corn) and 
RAUNA KUOKKANEN, RESHAPING THE UNIVERSITY: RESPONSIBILITY, INDIGENOUS 
EPISTEMES, AND THE LOGIC OF THE GIFT ch. 1 (2007) (for a multifaceted approach to the 
complex notion, non-essentialized worldview, and logic of “the gift”). 
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or internationally while having to contend with the compounding 
challenges of European settlement, assimilation, and displacement.7 
INTRODUCTION 
As both practice and discipline, international law has been the 
subject of serious and sustained internal and external critiques since 
its inception. In fact, the “inception” of international law itself has 
been the subject of serious and sustained critique for some time now. 
This debate is of special relevance for Indigenous peoples, most of 
whom suffer from a double burden in international law, as they are 
neither Europeans nor dominant political actors within the states 
whose borders now contain and divide their traditional territories. 
Apart from the changing role, place, and agency of Indigenous 
peoples in international law and fora generally,8 this article raises the 
issue of Indigenous peoples’ prominence (or lack thereof) within 
critical and alternative approaches to international law, namely 
deconstructive/historical and Third World9 Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL). The focus on critical and alternative 
approaches to international law speaks to the need for these theories 
and actors to learn from one another in their attempts to both describe 
the worlds comprised by international law and to change them. While 
the title of this article refers to the “South of the North” and the 
Fourth World generally, my focus in the following largely remains on 
Indigenous peoples and nations located within (and sometimes across) 
the borders of the Canadian state.10 
 
7 JOHN BORROWS, JUSTICE WITHIN: INDIGENOUS LEGAL TRADITIONS (2006). 
8 See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1996) [hereinafter ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES]; James Anaya, Keynote Address: 
Indigenous Law and Its Contribution to Global Pluralism, 6 INDIGENOUS L.J. 3 (2007); S. 
James Anaya, Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have Contributed to International 
Human Rights Law, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 107 (2006); JAMES (SA’KE’J) 
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, INDIGENOUS DIPLOMACY AND THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES: 
ACHIEVING UN RECOGNITION (2008). 
9 The term “Third World” has been defined, and resisted definition, widely, but arose in 
the context of the Cold War to distinguish between capitalist (First World), communist 
(Second World) and decolonized, non-aligned (Third World) countries. In this historical 
context, and as a political project see VIJAY PRASHAD, THE DARKER NATIONS: A 
PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE THIRD WORLD 6–7, 11 (2007). In legal scholarship, see also 
Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal 
Discourse, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 356 n.15 (1998) (similarly noting French demographer 
Albert Sauvy’s non-derogatory coining of the term in a 1952 newspaper column). 
10 In Canada, the term “Indigenous” is sometimes used in the international context or 
interchangeably with “Aboriginal” as a general term domestically, though it is only the 
latter term that is included and defined as including the Indian Inuit, and Metis peoples of 
Canada. See Constitution Act § 35(2), 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 
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This Article begins by discussing two major writers who, 
respectively, form parts of two critical approaches to international law 
that have active and engaged followings in the legal academy. After 
assessing the valuable linguistic and historical lessons in some of the 
work of Martti Koskenniemi, the article touches upon two examples 
of Indigenous inter-National laws germane to, but not always 
acknowledged within, critical alternative histories of international 
law. In part, this acknowledgement requires a contestation of the term 
itself, given Indigenous petitions at imperial international law, 
transnationally with respect to domestic Canadian law, advocacy and 
activism at inter-state international law, and the abiding practice of 
Indigenous legal traditions and inter-National law and diplomacy 
amongst Indigenous peoples themselves. Next, this Article looks 
briefly at how the work of Antony Anghie and more recent writing 
within TWAIL address the nexus to Indigenous peoples, including 
lingering issues and questions as to the existence and quality of this 
relationship. 
The final section of this Article looks in greater detail at the work 
and advocacy of Levi General in the 1920s at the League of Nations. 
General is known more widely by the hereditary chiefly title of 
Deskáheh (Young Bear Clan, Cayuga Nation, Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy (Six Nations of the Grand River)).11 Given his inability 
to secure a hearing of the Six Nations’ grievances against Canada 
before that League, this episode in the early institutional life of 
 
11 (U.K.). When referring to legal systems, I use “Indigenous” to refer to the laws of 
Indigenous nations and peoples, while I use “Aboriginal” to refer to the laws of the state. 
Where known or required for context, I also use the names of specific nations (e.g., 
Secwepmec or Cayuga), clans, confederacies (e.g., Six Nations), regional/international 
political organizations (e.g., Inuit Circumpolar Conference), and legislative or policy terms 
E.g., Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 (showing that this holds true for “Indian,” or “status 
Indian’”or “First Nations” under this act). For a further elaboration of the terminology in 
the Canadian context, see Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 2: 
Restructuring the Relationship, LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, http://www.collections 
canada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071124125001/http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sh1 
_e.html#Volume%202 (last updated Feb. 8, 2006). 
11 Levi General was installed in 1917 as a new hereditary chief of the Cayuga Nation by 
the matron of the Young Bear Clan, Louise Miller. See Donald B. Smith, Deskaheh (Levi 
General), THE DICTIONARY OF CANADIAN BIOGRAPHY ONLINE, vol. XV, 1921–1930 
(2000), http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?id_nbr=8103. The Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy, originally comprised of the Five Nations of Cayuga, Seneca, Onondaga, 
Mohawk, and Oneida, is now comprised of Six Nations, reflecting the adoption of the 
Tuscarora Nation under the sponsorship of the Oneida Nation. See also Oren Lyons, 
Indian Self-Government in the Haudenosaunee Constitution, 55 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 117 
(1986). For more information, see infra note 114; infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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international law serves as one example of the transnational 
disappearing acts perpetrated by the then-burgeoning Canadian state12 
and its laws, as well as those of the British Empire, and the European 
international establishment.13 It also provides the chance to recount 
the resistance to such magic tricks by the Haudenosaunee, and other 
Indigenous peoples, ever since. The pooling of such critical insights 
and histories will be a necessary step to achieve the emancipatory 
visions sought by a diversity of approaches (Indigenous, 
deconstructive, Third World, feminist, radical/Marxist, Fifth World, 
etc.), not the least being fundamental changes in “the politics of the 
economy (who writes the rules) and the economics of politics (who 
holds the economic muscle to allow themselves to write the rules).”14 
The aforementioned “pooling” and the attempt to build such 
coalitions could easily be met with skepticism. In fact, in his preface 
to The Fourth World, the late and seminal scholar, lawyer, and 
activist Vine Deloria (Standing Rock Sioux) described his distrust for 
the new American left’s ideology of the Third World purporting “to 
be a great coalition of oppressed peoples of the world,” in the name of 
decolonized African and Asian states, which also somehow attributed 
“to people of foreign lands a sophisticated knowledge of North 
American affairs that they did not have or feel.”15 However, Deloria 
also wrote that, “No contemporary political and economic structure 
has to be. Whatever structures do exist must eventually find a reason 
for their existence above and beyond the political and economic 
values of today.”16 In part, this Article attempts to bridge the 
 
12 On this point, see Grace Li Xiu Woo, Canada’s Forgotten Founders: The Modern 
Significance of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Application for Membership in the League 
of Nations L., SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. (Apr. 30, 2003), http://elj.warwick.ac.uk 
/global/03-1/woo.html. 
13 See ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 8, at 57. 
14 PRASHAD, supra note 9, at 213. On the necessity of this “pooling” of critical 
resources of resistance, see ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319–20 (2004). 
15 Vine Deloria, Foreword to GEORGE MANUEL & MICHAEL POSLUNS, THE FOURTH 
WORLD: AN INDIAN REALITY, at x (1974). 
16 See id. at xii. Born in 1933, Vine Deloria Jr. was a member of the Standing Rock 
Sioux (South Dakota), an activist, author (e.g., Custer Died for Your Sins; God is Red), 
educator, executive director of the National Congress of American Indians, lawyer, 
founder of the Institute for the Development of Indian Law, professor of law and political 
science at the University of Arizona, professor of American Indian studies and history 
(adjunct in law, political science, religion) at the University of Colorado, and one of the 
foremost American/Indian leaders and thinkers. He died in 2005. See James Treat, 
Introduction to VINE DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA 
1-18 (James Treat ed., 1999). 
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knowledge gap of “North American affairs” in the aforementioned 
critical approaches to international law by layering in some lessons 
from inter-National Indigenous laws while showing the related, but 
distinct, challenges of Indigenous advocacy at inter-state international 
law. 
I 
WHERE LANGUAGE AND HISTORY MIGHT FAIL 
Critical approaches to international law, its history, and its theory 
are of particular importance to this article given the fact that they 
challenge dominant conceptions of the field while opening space for 
the emergence or recognition of alternative approaches. This next Part 
looks at one particularly powerful and compelling example in some of 
the scholarship of a practitioner and professor of international law, 
Martti Koskenniemi. I point to what I see as one particular 
shortcoming and propose supplements from inter-National Indigenous 
legal traditions that benefit from his otherwise convincing critique of 
international law and its historiography. 
A. On Speaking Without Being Heard 
For Finnish international law scholar Martti Koskenniemi, the 
characterization of international law as two equally competent 
advocates capable of arguing diametrically opposite positions using 
the same principles underpins his textual turn and conception of 
international law as a language.17 Its history comprises the uses of, 
struggles over, and rising or falling enthusiasm and powers of that 
language over time. Given this, at best, ambivalence towards 
international law, pursuing a genealogical history of international law 
thus requires a contextual history of people and their projects.18 This 
approach to international law as a language cultivates a careful 
skepticism of grand narrative, rejecting the three-headed monster of 
traditional legal historiography (“great men” hagiography, formal rule 
 
17 See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 3–5, 12, 565–69 (2005). 
18 See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1870–1960 (2001). For the motivation behind 
this historically-focused complement to his earlier book, see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 17, 
at 617. See also George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, Martti Koskenniemi and the 
Historiographical Turn in International Law, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 539, 541, no.7 (2005). 
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history, and epochs of domination).19 Thus, his alternative history of 
international law that is not simply a “shiny white knight” in 
opposition to state sovereignty or reasons may be important for a 
deconstructionist approach to international law.20 In the context of 
this article, this invocation of alternative histories of international law 
is appealing where Emmerich de Vattel’s positivist understanding, of 
the internal self-determination and external nonintervention that 
breeds the equality of states, otherwise reigns supreme. 
In the particular genealogy I had the good fortune to read and hear, 
Koskenniemi emphasized that the key historical event was not 
Columbus’ voyage in 1492, but instead French interventions in 
Northern Italy in 1494 and following.21 The arc of the story to be told 
conformed to the following five-part incremental movement: (1) from 
the Medieval vocabularies of canonists, e.g., Aquinas’ regnum 
animarum (ruling or government of souls); to (2) Scholastic 
vocabularies of natural law distinct from jus gentium, e.g., Francisco 
de Vitoria; to (3) early Modern vocabularies where natural law is 
made equivalent to jus gentium, e.g., Samuel Pufendorf; to (4) 
Modern vocabularies of jus gentium as a “system,” e.g., Emmerich de 
Vattel, and then subsequently shifting completely from law; to (5) the 
language of economics, e.g., Friedrich von Martens and Adam 
Smith.22 This movement aimed to show that international law was not 
and cannot be opposed to the state, nor used to critique its interests or 
sovereignty in any facile or guaranteed way. This is because 
international law is a functional “part and parcel” of state power and 
 
19 Martti Koskenniemi, The History of International Law Today, RECHTSGESCHICHTE, 
6–9 (2004), www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MHistory.pdf. 
20 See, e.g., KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 17, at 607 (noting “knights in white armour” 
with reference to the critique of Western military interventions to the elision of structural 
financial and economic interventions). This critique was made by Anne Orford. ANNE 
ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
21 But see NICOLÁS WEY GÓMEZ, THE TROPICS OF EMPIRE: WHY COLUMBUS SAILED 
SOUTH TO THE INDIES (2008) (noting the continuing fallout of Columbus’ assumptions for 
North-South relations). 
22 See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Raison d’état: Rethinking the 
Prehistory of International Law, in THE ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: 
ALBERICO GENTILI AND THE JUSTICE OF EMPIRE 297–339 (Benedict Kingsbury & 
Benjamin Straumann eds., 2010); see also Seven Lecture Series to the University of 
Toronto Law Faculty Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Raison D’état: An 
Alternative History (Jan. 2010) (syllabus on file with author). 
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the politics that accompany its use or abuse.23 In this way, 
Koskenniemi concludes that the writings of jurists in this earlier 
period (prior to that treated in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations) do not 
actually amount to an autonomous international law per se, so much 
as they comprise its prehistory.24 
However, Koskenniemi’s conception of international law as a 
language, and attempt to recast the history of its use as one of 
continuous and particular political struggles, seems slightly 
incomplete.25 First, the critical assumption that we all speak the same 
professional language skirts the issues of those who speak this 
language but remain unheard or ultimately reject its fundamental, 
statist grammar. Reflecting on his 1989 book From Apology to Utopia 
in the epilogue to its 2005 reissue, Koskenniemi notes that the book 
“seeks to articulate the competence of native language-speakers of 
international law,” and specifically with an emphasis to the use of 
international law’s rules and principles where lawyers’ competence is 
not questioned because they support opposing sides in their work.26 
He goes on to write that: “[t]his is why the linguistic analogy seems 
so tempting. Native language speakers of, say, Finnish, are also able 
to support contrasting political agendas without the question of the 
genuineness of their linguistic competence ever arising.”27 
Building on a linguistic analogy that seeks to “go beyond 
metaphor,” this construction of international law does not necessarily 
 
23 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Advantage of Treaties. International law in the 
Enlightenment, 13 EDINBURGH L. REV. 27, 30 (2009); see also Koskenniemi, supra note 
22. 
24 See Koskenniemi, supra note 22 (“The tradition and style of writing about 
international matters in the vocabulary of law, in particular of natural law and the ius 
gentium, whatever the fashion in which the line between the two was drawn, during the 
period from Gentili to Adam Smith was not the same as the ‘international law’ that grew 
from the liberal legal activism of the late nineteenth century. When natural law finally 
knew what it wanted to be—and needed to be in order to fulfil its programme—it became 
economics. There would no longer be any search for a legal proprium. That would become 
a task of courts and jurisprudence classes, distant from the serious business of governing 
the commonwealth.”). 
25 Compare Martti Koskenniemi, The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (David Armstrong ed., 2009) 
(footnotes omitted) (“[T]hese ideas lie behind the development of international law from a 
philosophical preoccupation in the eighteenth century to an instrument of diplomacy and 
an academic discipline in the nineteenth and an institutionally oriented formal—legal 
technique in the twentieth century—each period conserving something of the memory of 
its predecessor as a residue of assumptions and fallback positions.“). 
26 See Koskenniemi, supra note 17, at 567. 
27 Id. at 568 (emphasis added). 
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reflect the true diversity of those caught up in the system that 
produces good legal arguments. In a different context, political 
science and Aboriginal Studies scholar Rauna Kuokkanen (Sámi) 
argues for just this making of space and showing of hospitality 
towards Indigenous epistemes in the academy. Describing the Deatnu 
river bordering Norway and Finland, Kuokkanen notes that 
“Samiland is also divided, by the borders of four nation-states” such 
that the “people on the river have been multicultural and multilingual 
out of necessity—understanding other cultures and languages has 
been the key to daily survival.”28 People crossed the border for food, 
health care, school, family ties, news, provisions, and salmon.29 
Following the war the border started to be patrolled due to the 
differing wartime allegiances of Finland and Norway, which led to 
border posts and the weakening of connections across the Deatnu 
river and restricting land ownership across the river-border.30 
Kuokkanen further notes the long-time and continued “cultural and 
linguistic mingling” along the Deatnu: 
Communication along the river takes place in various languages, 
and there are always people who do not understand all of the 
languages spoken. This is entirely normal, yet I paid attention to it 
only after my mother told me a story about a visitor from a 
completely monolingual part of Finland who expressed his 
uneasiness with languages he did not know. He had been resting 
upstairs when he realized that people downstairs were speaking at 
least a couple of different languages and that none of them was 
Finnish. Imagine, he thought, all of these ‘foreign’ languages and 
so little Finnish even though this is Finland!31 
Kuokkanen’s description of the multiplicity of languages in one 
space—both across states and an interrupted traditional territory—
serves to underscore some of the limits of linguistic/textual 
methodologies of international law or its history.32 
Koskenniemi’s critical assumption that we must all be native 
speakers of a professional language is useful, but it is also clear that 
“native language speakers of, say, Finnish” are not necessarily able to 
support opposing political agendas without their linguistic 
 
28 KUOKKANEN, Indigenous, supra note 6, at x–xi. 
29 Id. at ix–xi. 
30 Id. at xi–xii. 
31 Id. at xii (emphasis in original). 
32 See, e.g., Timo Koivurova, Sovereign States and Self-Determining Peoples: Carving 
Out a Place for Transnational Indigenous Peoples in a World of Sovereign States, 12 
INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 191, 211 (2010) (noting that “general international law does not 
really give much politico-legal space for peoples divided by [state] borders”). 
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competence being raised or their opposition simply being lost in the 
translations.33 People might not all speak Finnish in Finland, and not 
just because they choose to speak French. The enunciation of an 
“unauthorized” practice of international law, as detailed in 
Deskaheh’s attempts in Part IV below, can conflict with statist 
monopolies on access to international legal professions and the 
procedural aspects of international law. For example, in response to 
growing activism domestically and internationally with respect to 
land claims issues, Canada passed an amendment in 1927 (in effect 
until its repeal in 1951) requiring a license from the Superintendent 
General (Indian Affairs) for anyone soliciting funds for Indian legal 
claims, with punishment on conviction being either a fine or two 
months in jail.34 This liability placed upon Indigenous peoples is an 
example of the state’s indirect determination of who gets to speak 
international law in the first place, which is reinforced by the 
determination of the international community of states about whose 
international legal speech is even heard. In such situations, faced 
inordinately by Indigenous peoples, it definitely matters that 
Koskenniemi seeks to cast international law as a formal language that 
assumes equality of competence while simultaneously shifting its 
pre/history from the fiction of idealistic opposition to its more 
accurate positivist concert with state powers. Koskenniemi’s project 
is helpful for the domestic, transnational, and international work of 
 
33 LAWRENCE VENUTI, THE TRANSLATOR’S INVISIBILITY: A HISTORY OF 
TRANSLATION 18–20 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the inevitable, largely invisible, violence 
of translation and the difference between “domesticating” and “foreignizing” methods). 
34 See, e.g., The revised Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, § 149A; COMMISSION ON 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, LOOKING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK: PART TWO: FALSE 
ASSUMPTIONS AND A FAILED RELATIONSHIP, CHAPTER 9—THE INDIAN ACT (2010), 
available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071207032318/http 
://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sg25_e.html#89. Although protection of Indians from 
unscrupulous lawyers was the purported reason for the amendment, the Royal Commission 
argued that: “The true reason probably had more to do with the desire of federal officials 
to reduce the effectiveness of Indian leaders such as Fred Loft and of organizations such as 
the Allied Tribes of British Columbia and the Six Nations Council. These groups had 
already proven troublesome to Indian affairs officials because of their insistence that their 
unresolved land claims be dealt with. [. . .] The effect of this provision was not only to 
harass and intimidate national Indian leaders, but also to impede Indians all across Canada 
from acquiring legal assistance in prosecuting claims until this clause was repealed in 
1951. The claims of most British Columbia Indians as well as those of the Six Nations are 
still outstanding—as are hundreds of others.” Id. (notes omitted). Seth Gordon also notes 
problems such as the “persistent objector” exception and that human rights laws are not 
self-executing in the United States. See Seth Gordon, Indigenous Rights in Modern 
International Law from a Critical Third World Perspective, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 401, 
423–24 (2007). 
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Indigenous peoples, but it must also clearly acknowledge the need to 
recognize precolonial sources of authority in the laws and practices of 
other political communities such as Indigenous peoples. Critical 
approaches to international law would also benefit from discerning 
the social and political determinants of speaking these Indigenous 
laws and claims to power in the context of inter-state international 
law. The issue of language (and knowledge) loss and revitalization in 
the wake of colonial encounter and assimilation programs, such as the 
Indian residential schools system, only heightens this concern.35 
B. The History of International Law, Take Two? 
Following from the issue of language, it also seems that telling the 
stories and histories of particular political struggles serves to broaden 
the field of international law and point to the potential for alternative, 
even radically different, future structures of international law. If 
international law is the stories that we tell ourselves,36 then are we 
telling the right stories, or all of the relevant ones? For instance, 
should “colonialism-on-the-ground” and its negotiations not factor 
into the conversation of alternative histories to international law? It 
might be argued that such stories are not seen to be law or legal per 
se, or if they are, that they do not belong to the domain, or discipline, 
or profession, or practice, or language of international law. Yet, 
Koskenniemi expansively retells international law’s history as: 
• domestic stories for domestic audiences; 
• the usurpation or turn from passions to interests to economics;37 
• informal and then formal and then again informal colonialism;38 
• the relatively short-lived heroic phase of white knight 
institutions;39 
 
35 See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Shelly Wright & Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist 
Approaches to International Law: Reflections from Another Century, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 32–44 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 
2005) (detailing Wright’s work as Northern Director of Akitsiraq Law School in Iqaluit, 
Nunavut, in charge of a transnational Indigenous legal education in Inuit, Canadian, and 
international law, including required learning of Inuktitut language). In response to a 
critique of Koskenniemi’s criticism of the feminist project for aggravating the fragility of 
international law while failing to provide the formal distance necessary for the good 
society, the authors emphasize international law’s failure to focus on those beyond the 
powerful few; essentially, they ask the important question: formality for whom? Id. at 44. 
36 Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007). 
37 See Koskenniemi, supra note 22, at 297–339. 
38 See Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish 
Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 32 (2011). 
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• the fall or death of that field as it moved to the United States and 
American realism, pragmatism and functionalism rose to 
prominence;40 
• the non-traditions of the pre-Revolutionary international law of 
France or the loss of the reins of power in Germany;41 or 
• an acknowledgment of the fragmentation of international law’s 
present (where these lex specialis fragments do not materialize 
from ‘thin air’ but have their own heritages and histories worth 
telling in various traditions and competing languages).42 
It now seems untenable that Indigenous legal histories do not yet 
make it into this radically expanded conversation. A 2007 working 
paper by Koskenniemi is instructive here for my argument that the 
acknowledgment of pluralism requires that it be acknowledged all the 
way up and down.43 
As Koskenniemi notes in the paper on sociological thought and 
international law, international lawyers “spoke about universal laws 
of social life that, as confidently assumed by Montesquieu, would 
cover the whole of humankind ‘not excepting the Iroquois 
themselves.’ This may be true. And the fact that there are no longer 
any Iroquois tribes will have to be the measure with which we weigh 
our shared globalizing modernity.”44 Of course, as the many 
references in this paper—and hopefully the paper itself—make clear, 
both mainstream and critical approaches to international law cannot 
ignore the continued existence of “Iroquois tribes” or the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy or other Indigenous peoples. 
On Turtle Island (in North America), for example, Indigenous 
peoples have long survived the “opening of the frontier” and the 
“closing of democracy” that followed encounters with Europeans. 
 
39 Koskenniemi, supra note 17. 
40 See id. at 438, 474–76. 
41 See Koskenniemi, supra note 28, at 40, 47, 51, 62–63 (noting the lack of significant 
international law tradition in pre-Revolutionary France or Germany, and that French and 
German lawyers surrendered the reins of power to politics and economics). 
42 Martti Koskenniemi, UN Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law (Apr. 13, 2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org 
/ilc/guide/1_9.htm. 
43 On the trickiness of scale, see Outi Korhonen, The Role of History in International 
Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 45 (2000). 
44 Martti Koskenniemi, Max Weber Lecture, Not Excepting the Iroquois Themselves: 
Sociological thought and International Law 5 (Apr. 2007) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKFlorence-07k.pdf. 
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However, as noted, they do not always make it into the alternative 
historicizing and contemporary repurposing of critical and 
postmodern international law. It is clear that this conspicuous absence 
cannot be attributed to the lack of government or political community 
or impact of natural law or jus gentium among Indigenous peoples in, 
for example, North America. Instead, these histories and legal 
traditions were domesticated to the European sovereign’s black box, 
which accompanies the alternating story of international law’s 
contested mutual constitution with raison d’état. Indeed, as discussed 
at greater length in a later section, Levi General’s Haudenosaunee 
delegation in the 1920s to have the League of Nations consider the 
Six Nations’ dispute with Canada is a prime example of how the logic 
and politics of international law determined that their “grievances 
were a domestic concern of Canada and hence outside the League’s 
competency.”45 Unfortunately, this act of disappearance in the formal 
and European legal sense also takes place in the historiographical 
aftermath. As argued above, it remains to incorporate the critical 
insights of Koskenniemi’s deconstruction and historicism, and his 
powerful view of the real legacy of the Spanish scholastics,46 with the 
critical realities of colonialism-on-the-ground. 
In fact, there are still Iroquois tribes; indeed, the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy adopted the Tuscarora Nation and expanded from the 
Five Nations to the Six Nations Confederacy around 1714.47 This 
adoption was effected by virtue of the Haudenosaunee Kaianerekowa 
(Great Law of Peace/Great Good Way), which dates from between 
the eleventh and sixteenth centuries.48 In helping to tell part of this 
 
45 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 8, at 57 (1996). 
46 See Koskenniemi, supra note 44, at 12, 32, 35–36 (“[T]he formation of centralized 
political communities—states—that demanded absolute loyalty from their citizens; the 
emergence of a global economic system based on private ownership and the search for 
profit; and continuous warfare, not only against the infidel, but among Christian rulers 
them- selves,” which is saying the same as “early articulators of the much more powerful 
and long-standing type of informal imperial domination that is achieved through a 
worldwide pattern of acquisition and exchange of private property by which—as the rulers 
of Castile would themselves learn quite rapidly—formal state policies are also controlled, 
enabled, or undermined, as befits the global market.”). 
47 Darlene M. Johnston, The Quest of the Six Nations Confederacy for Self-
Determination, 44 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986) (citing BRUCE JOHANSEN, 
FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE IROQUOIS AND THE RATIONALE FOR 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 21 (1982)). 
48 JOHN FADDEN, THE GREAT LAW OF PEACE OF THE LONGHOUSE PEOPLE: IROQUOIS, 
LEAGUE OF SIX NATIONS 66–70, 72–78 (1973); see also BRUCE JOHANSEN, FORGOTTEN 
FOUNDERS: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE IROQUOIS AND THE RATIONALE FOR THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 21–22 (1982); FRANK G. SPECK & ALEXANDER GENERAL, 
MIDWINTER RITES OF THE CAYUGA LONG HOUSE 16 (1949); PAUL A.W. WALLACE, THE 
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story, legal scholar Robert A. Williams, Jr. (Lumbee) has presented 
American Indian visions of law and peace, which cross borders, 
cultures, languages, and are all about external relations in the law and 
governance of political communities.49 Williams notes that: 
The Encounter era treaty tradition recalls the long-neglected fact in 
American history that there was a time in our national experience 
when Indians tried to create a new type of society with Europeans 
on the multicultural frontiers of colonial North America. 
Recovering this shared legal world is crucial to the task of 
reconstructing our contemporary understandings of the sources and 
nature of the rights belonging to Indian peoples in present-day 
American society. . . . In countless reiterations, the Encounter era 
treaty literature affirms the sovereign capacity of Indian tribes to 
engage in bilateral governmental relations, to exercise power and 
control over their lands and resources, and to maintain their internal 
forms of self-government free from outside interference.50 
Williams’ references to bilateral relations, the exercise of power 
and control over lands and resources, and self-government form just 
the tip of an iceberg of Indigenous laws and legal traditions. Although 
there is no space here to begin to scratch this surface internationally, 
let alone in Canada, it is worthwhile to at least gesture toward the 
myriad Indigenous legal traditions that would fruitfully inform 
alternative and critical histories of international law for the purposes 
of accuracy, decolonization, and justice.51 
C. Indigenous Inter-National Laws 
Although it is an artificial distinction, as should become clear, a 
focus on Indigenous legal traditions (ILT) that speak to external 
relations, such as between nations, to the land, animals, and 
newcomers, points to their relevance to this topic. For instance, given 
the frequently kinship-based practice of Indigenous law, there are 
 
WHITE ROOTS OF PEACE 41–42 (1946). But see TAIAIKE ALFRED, PEACE, POWER, 
RIGHTEOUSNESS: AN INDIGENOUS MANIFESTO 126 (1999) (cautioning against 
misappropriation and reification of a reduced-to-text version of the Kaianerekowa). 
49 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY 
VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997); Robert A. Williams, Linking Arms 
Together: Multicultural Constitutionalism in a North American Indigenous Vision of Law 
and Peace, 82 CAL. L. REV. 981 (1994). On the debate over the legacy of the colonizing 
legal tradition brought to the New World, see the fascinating contribution in Koskenniemi, 
supra note 44, at 10–11 (noting differences in his approach versus the postcolonial 
approach, by Anghie and others, and the liberal defense by Georg Cavallar and others). 
50 WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 8–9 (notes omitted). 
51 For one of the best examples in Canada, see JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S 
INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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several historical and contemporary examples of international (or 
inter-National) Indigenous laws that are relevant to alternative 
histories, repurposing mainstream international law, and the Third 
World project (discussed below). In a 2006 discussion paper written 
for the now-defunct Law Commission of Canada and entitled “Justice 
Within,” Anishinabe legal scholar John Borrows notes that: 
Aboriginal peoples were the earliest practitioners of law in Canada. 
Living in communities and nations across the land, they developed 
norms and practices to govern their social interaction, regulate 
trade, resolve disputes and govern the relationships between 
different nations. The diverse traditions of different Aboriginal 
peoples grew into highly developed systems of law that guided 
Aboriginal societies for centuries in the governance of community, 
the environment and relationships between people. Passed down 
through the generations in stories, songs, ceremonies and practices, 
these legal traditions reflect the unique experiences of different 
Aboriginal peoples and communities, embodying their values and 
beliefs and resonating with their cultures. 
The first Europeans to arrive in North America recognized 
Indigenous legal traditions and often followed Indigenous laws. 
Aboriginal laws, protocols and procedures provided the framework 
for the first treaties between Aboriginal peoples and the Dutch, 
French, and British Crowns. Commercial transactions often were 
conducted in accordance with Indigenous traditions, with the giving 
of gifts, the extension of credit and the standards of trade often 
based on Indigenous legal concepts. 52 
Among many other topics, Borrows outlines examples of ILT, 
including Mi’kmaq, Haudenosaunee, Anishinabek, Cree, Métis, 
Carrier, Nisga’a, and Inuit legal traditions. For example, Borrows 
details a wide variety of “Aboriginal-to-Aboriginal” relations existing 
prior to encounters with Europeans, including: 
• treaties; 
• inter-marriages; 
• contracts of trade and commerce; 
• mutual recognition for peace; 
• occupations of land to secure resources; and 
• “wider systems of diplomacy in use to maintain peace through 
councils and elaborate protocols.” Examples include feasting, 
smoking the peace pipe, holding a potlatch, exchanging 
ceremonial objects, and engaging in long orations.53 
 
52 John Borrows, Justice Within: Indigenous Legal Traditions (Aug. 2006), available at 
http://dalspace.dal.ca/dspace/handle/10222/10229. 
53 Id. at 171–72. 
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Although many examples are about making or maintaining relations, 
the particular subset of treaty relationships, alliances, and 
confederacies is of particular relevance, as it comprises clear 
examples of Indigenous inter-National law.54 The legal traditions and 
practices of two Indigenous Nations (as opposed to the fragmented 
hundreds of Canadian state-legislated bands (a.k.a. villages)) are 
particularly informative, namely the Mi’kmaq and Anishinabek. As 
should be clear, the wide variety and complexity of ILT prevents even 
the appearance of a comprehensive treatment here, but nevertheless, 
for myself, and hopefully others, this must remain a starting point 
only. 
D. Recurring Themes in Two Examples 
“Transnational confederations” (Nikmanen) exist or existed 
between the Mi’kmaw Nation and its Nikmaq (allies), comprising the 
Beothuk, Wulustukw keuwiuk (Maliseet-Passamaquoddy), the 
Wabanki Confederacy, Innu or Montagnais groups, Inuit, and even 
Saint Lawrence Haudenosaunee (Mohawk) in the 1500s.55 Sákéj 
Henderson (Bear Clan, Chickasaw Nation; Cheyenne) notes that the 
norms of peace and harmony requiring “the victor to give presents 
and share with the losing party, to satisfy the reality that both parties 
had breached the law . . . often confused English negotiators, who 
defined peace in terms of submission and reparations from the 
defeated.”56 Similarly, Mi’kmaq treaties were “living agreements” 
that “created a permanent, living relationship . . .  expressed in terms 
of kinship—the English king as ‘father’ and the colonists as 
‘brothers’” and requiring routine meetings “to renew friendships, 
reconcile misunderstandings, and share each other’s understandings, 
experiences and resources.”57 Sákéj asserts that most of these treaties 
 
54 In addition to the work of John Borrows, I am especially indebted here to Darlene 
Johnston, Dawnis Kennedy, and Lee Maracle on the recognition of inter-National 
Indigenous laws. 
55 James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, First Nations’ Legal Inheritances in Canada: 
The Mikmaq Model 23 MAN. L.J. 1, 1–31 (1996) [hereinafter Henderson, First Nations’ 
Legal Inheritances in Canada]; JAMES (SÁKÉJ) YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, MI’KMAW 
CONCORDAT 17 (Donna Davis ed., 1997) [hereinafter HENDERSON, MI’KMAW 
CONCORDAT]. 
56 E.g., Henderson, First Nations’ Legal Inheritances in Canada, supra note 55, at § D; 
HENDERSON, MI’KMAW CONCORDAT, supra note 55, at 17. 
57 Henderson, First Nations’ Legal Inheritances in Canada, supra note 55. For further 
examples of kinship-making, see J.R. MILLER, COMPACT, CONTRACT, COVENANT: 
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were renewal ceremonies reflecting “the flexible, kin-like nature of 
the confederation” conceptualized by the metaphor of the chain and 
combining the practices of all of the parties in a “sui generis” way.58 
In a different context animated by similar principles, Borrows 
describes the 1701 treaty between the Haudenosaunee and the 
Anishinabek near Sault Ste. Marie, which was transacted orally and 
recorded on wampum with the image of a “bowl with one spoon” in 
order that “both nations would share their hunting grounds in order to 
obtain food,” with the spoon guaranteeing that there would be neither 
knives nor bloodshed on the shared land.59 Writing on the treaty, 
Leanne Simpson (Mississauga of Nishnaabeg Nation) argues for the 
need to destabilize and decolonize the concept of the treaty and 
instead focus on their purpose of maintaining good relationships as a 
basis for lasting peace, Bimaadiziwin (living the good life), and being 
in balance with the natural world, family, clan, and nation through the 
Seven Grandfather teachings.60 Citing Borrows and Grassy Narrows 
elder Judy DaSilva, Simpson emphasizes the diplomatic agreements 
and treaty relationships with attendant rights and responsibilities to 
respect the animal nations or risk their departure from the territory.61 
Akin to Sakej’s explanation of Mi’kmaw treaties, Simpson 
emphasizes the open, ongoing, reciprocal, and dynamic relationships 
requiring nurturing, maintenance, and respect. This respect entailed 
“waiting in the woods” to build a fire before crossing to another’s 
territory to be met with wampum, a feast, and the exchange of gifts; 
generally, visitors were treated with “the utmost respect to promote 
peaceful diplomatic relations between nations.”62 Simpson 
underscores the relevance of such relationships in contemporary times 
given that they, as with the “Common Dish” relationship between 
 
ABORIGINAL TREATY-MAKING IN CANADA at 7–10, 38 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2009). 
58 Henderson, First Nations’ Legal Inheritances in Canada, supra note 55. 
59 BORROWS, supra note 6, at 172. Borrows also describes the Feast of the Dead 
conducted with the Wendat in order to ease tensions and celebrate ancestors. Id. at 173. In 
the context of the Haudenosaunee, see also PAUL A.W. WALLACE, THE WHITE ROOTS OF 
PEACE 31–32 (1946) (Deganawidah and “one dish” principles with common access, 
sharing, and the avoidance of bloodshed). 
60 Leanne Simpson, Looking after Gdoo-naaganinaa: Precolonial Nishnaabeg 
Diplomatic and Treaty Relationships, 23 WICAZO SA REV. 29, 31–32 (2008). Borrows 
poignantly evokes these teachings in John Borrows, Seven Generations, Seven Teachings: 
Ending the Indian Act (May 2008), Research Paper for the National Centre for First 
Nations Governance (online: http://www.fngovernance.org/research/john_borrows.pdf). 
61 Simpson, supra note 60, 34–35. 
62 Id. at 36. 
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Nishnaabeg people and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, set “forth 
terms for taking care of a shared territory while maintaining separate, 
independent sovereign nations.”63 Simpson emphasizes that the dish 
was practiced through responsibilities that included “taking care of 
the dish” by only taking as much as needed, sharing everything, and 
not wasting any part of the animal in accordance with Nishnaabeg 
environmental ethics.64 These ethics required decision making 
cognizant of impact upon “the plant and animal nations, in addition to 
the next seven generations of Nishnaabeg,” in turn providing “an 
ancient template for realizing separate jurisdictions within a shared 
territory.”65 
Having expanded the histories of international law, as well as 
problematized the professional languages of international law, it 
seems that both the mainstream and the critical histories can only be 
improved through acknowledgment of the laws and practices of other 
political communities, such as Indigenous peoples in the ongoing 
colonial encounter in North America. Ultimately, these histories 
would fruitfully inform formalist assertions emphasizing statist 
sovereign equality at international law in the face of arguably more 
threatening encroachments by private actors through the law of 
contract.66 This connection of the public to the private sectors is 
especially relevant in the case of, for example, Indigenous peoples in 
Canada, whose reserves, traditional territories, and unceded territories 
are also rich with much of the natural resource wealth sought by both 
foreign and domestic extractive industries.67 In these existing and 
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 37. 
65 Id. at 37, 42. This particular treaty relationship has captured the imagination of non-
Indigenous scholars and writers, such as Tony Hall and J.R. Saul, though the implications 
of the original context are not necessarily central in analyses aimed at different targets 
(i.e., American imperialism abroad and the “castrati” of the Canadian ruling elite). For a 
similar critique with respect to the Third World, the NIEO, and CHM, see Mickelson, 
supra note 9. 
66 See Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish 
Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 36 (2011). For a similar iteration from an English 
perspective, see KURT BURCH, “PROPERTY” AND THE MAKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
SYSTEM (1998). 
67 For example, see Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, James Anaya, Extractive industries operating within or near Indigenous territories 
A/HRC/18/35 (July 11, 2011). See also Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, 80th Session (Feb. 13–Mar. 9, 2012), http://www2.ohchr.org/english 
/bodies/cerd/cerds80.htm (“shadow reports” submitted by Indigenous organizations and 
Nations with respect to Canada). 
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potential conflict zones of mixed international, federal, and provincial 
jurisdictions, Indigenous laws and legal traditions emerge as 
important touchstones. If not always determinative, they would be 
informative in the counterpoints to automatic development afforded 
by the duty of consultation required of governments and private 
industry (if not yet to the extent of free, prior, and informed 
consent).68 Of course, Canada may be one of only a few places in the 
world where the issues of climate change, energy demands, resource 
extraction, development-induced displacement, temporary migrant 
labor, mixed public-private jurisdictions, transnational corporations, 
NGOs, and Indigenous peoples will remain important ones.  But that 
seems an unlikely scenario. 
The next Part of this Article pursues this theme in the context of 
Antony Anghie’s equally influential work and some of those within 
the larger, loose collection of international legal writers self-
identifying under the rubric of TWAIL. It then moves on to discuss 
one particular example of an Indigenous or Fourth World approach to 
international law through the work of Levi General (Deskaheh), the 
Six Nations Confederacy Council, and others in Canada, the United 
States, London, and the League of Nations (Geneva). The Article 
concludes with a brief discussion on potential ways for linking 
together different approaches to international law that potentially 
make common criticisms but sometimes fail to benefit from the 
chance to share knowledge from their respective experiences. 
II 
WHERE TWAIL MIGHT FAIL? THE THIRD WORLD IS NOT 
ENOUGH 
From a TWAIL perspective, postcolonial histories of international 
law that begin with an initial acknowledgment of Indigenous 
importance, or at least narrative necessity, are largely eclipsed by the 
focus on the European colonization and then decolonized states of 
Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. Of course, I am not arguing that this 
path-breaking approach is incorrect, but merely that it remains 
incomplete without returning to the so-called “scene of the crime.”69 
 
68 See also MANUEL & POSLUNS, supra note 3, at 252–54. 
69 This is especially true where there are transnational actors involved in the circulation 
and migration of cross-colonial spaces. For example, see AUDREY MACKLIN, 
HISTORICIZING NARRATIVES OF ARRIVAL: THE OTHER INDIAN OTHER 40–67 (Rebecca 
Johnson, Hester Lessard & Jeremy Webber eds., Storied Communities, 2010) (discussing 
the exclusion of the almost 400 British Indian subjects, mostly Punjabi Sikhs, aboard the 
Komagata Maru in 1914 at Vancouver Harbour, British Columbia, and its relationship to 
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International law, and especially critical approaches to it, must close 
this loop. 
In “Francisco de Vitoria and The Colonial Origins of International 
law,” the first chapter of Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law,70 international law scholar Antony Anghie 
describes the genesis of international law in the colonial encounter, 
specifically through the example of Spanish jurist Francisco de 
Vitoria’s writing on the Spanish expeditions and colonization of the 
so-called New World. In so doing, Anghie aims to show how 
international law did not emerge out of Europe fully-formed, but 
instead through a material and juridical encounter with Indigenous 
peoples across the Atlantic Ocean. Unlike other jurists of the time, 
Vitoria recognizes the humanity of Indigenous peoples and their 
government and title to the land in his lectures. 
However, Anghie skewers the promise of natural law in his 
criticism of the otherwise-lauded (“protector of native peoples”) 
Francisco Vitoria’s arguments against the “universal system of divine 
law administered by the Pope” to a “universal natural law system of 
jus gentium whose rules may be ascertained by the use of reason.”71 
Anghie outlines how, under jus gentium, the Spanish have a right to 
travel and sojourn in Indian lands such that they cannot be prevented 
as long as they do no harm.72 Anghie argues that the equality and 
reciprocity of this system serves as a means for penetrating Indian 
lands and territory where the failure to give friendly hearing or 
innocent passage, or resistance to proselytizing and conversion, would 
lead to just cause for perpetual war.73 For example, in part citing the 
 
the anti-colonial Ghadar movement in India). See also Sukhdeep Bhoi, Ghadar, The 
Immigrant Indian Outrage Against Canadian Injustices 1900–1918 (1998) (unpublished 
Master’s thesis, Queen’s University, available at http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2 
/tape17/PQDD_0001/MQ36004.pdf). 
70 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2004) (1996) [hereinafter ANGHIE, 
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY]. 
71 Id. at 20. 
72 See also James Muldoon, Discovery, Grant, Charter, Conquest, or Purchase: John 
Adams on the Legal Basis for English Possession of North America, in THE MANY 
LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 37, 40–46 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann 
eds., 2001). 
73 ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 70, at 23–30, 301. See also Felix 
S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States 31 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1 (1942); Robert A. Williams Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance 
Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 63–99 (1983). 
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traditional golden rule, Vitoria states that, “Also, thirdly, the 
sovereign of the Indians is bound by the law of nature to love the 
Spaniards. Therefore the Indians may not causelessly prevent the 
Spaniards from making their profit where this can be done without 
injury to themselves . . . . If, after the Spaniards have used all 
diligence . . . then they can make war on the Indians.”74 
Anghie then goes on to trace these colonial origins and further 
imperial impulses of international law through later centuries and 
forms, which are all underpinned by a civilizing mission and 
animated by an othering “dynamic of difference” (e.g., the “scramble 
for Africa” at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885; the mandate 
system of the League of Nations; the role of international financial 
institutions in the ‘development’ of the Third World; and, the specter 
and exception of terrorism and wars against it in international law). 
As noted above, I am particularly interested in Anghie’s tracing of the 
colonial origins of international law to Francisco de Vitoria and how 
these antecedents of colonial law are later connected to the 
descendants of imperial law. Anghie accomplishes this linkage in 
several ways. 
First, he does note some of the “brutalities” and colonial practices 
of the postcolonial state, including against smaller states, women, and 
Indigenous peoples.75 Second, and more substantially, in a section of 
his book titled The United States and Imperial Democracy, Anghie 
returns to “close the circle” by connecting American colonization and 
the wars and dispossession of, and later trust relationship over, Native 
Americans to Elihu Root’s brand of American colonialism-as-
trusteeship over the Philippines; Wilson’s international trusteeship in 
the Mandate system of the League of Nations; and, ultimately, a 
comparison between the historical construction of American Indians 
as savages and the contemporary justifications for occupying Iraq to 
combating Muslims-as-terrorists in the infinite War on Terror.76 In a 
footnote to this discussion, Anghie writes that  
 
74 Franciscus de Victoria, De Indis et De Ivre Belli Relectiones (Ernest Nys ed., J.P. 
Bate trans., 1532), available at www.constitution.org/victoria/victoria_.htm. See also 
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 70, at 294 (discussing Vitoria, 
defensive war of Spanish in conquest of Indians, and comparing to preemptive self-
defense of United States with respect to Iraq). 
75 See Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 749, 751 (2006) [hereinafter Anghie, The Evolution of 
International Law]. 
76 See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 70, at 287–90. 
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[i]t could be argued that the circle is now complete: Western 
approaches to the American Indian were shaped by Christian 
approaches to the pagans of the Middle East, as Robert Williams 
has shown. Now, through the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the 
descendants of those same peoples of the Middle East are being 
thought of in terms developed in relation to the American Indians.77  
I would only add that not only does this circle complete, but it also 
repeats, given the wider application of American and, inevitably, 
Canadian anti-terrorism efforts and rhetoric within broader regimes of 
securitization and surveillance of borders, lands, resources, and 
economic and political protest.78 Although it is a small point, it 
underscores my emphasis on the need to track these processes of 
“othering” within and through international law at all of its scales and 
without prejudging its sources or borders. 
Critical approaches to international law, especially ones such as 
TWAIL that reject the liberal protections of orthodox international 
law, must close the loop begun by the analysis of Anghie and others. 
However, despite the apparent dearth of such attention in the 
predecessors to Anghie and others’ work, in TWAIL 1,79 a newer 
 
democracy, but its entire history of encounters with the ‘other’, within the United States 
and also in its previous imperial ventures” Id. at 291. 
77 ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 70, at 290 (references omitted). 
Along these lines generally, see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION 
NATION:OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007); TONY HALL, THE BOWL WITH ONE 
SPOON, THE AMERICAN EMPIRE AND THE FOURTH WORLD (2003) and EARTH INTO 
PROPERTY: COLONIZATION, DECOLONIZATION, AND CAPITALISM (2010). 
78 See, e.g., Marlene Habib, Monitoring of First Nations Beefed up in '06: Documents 
M, CBC NEWS (June 13, 2011, 10:35 AM EST), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada 
/story/2011/06/13/first-nations-documents.html. See also Press Release, Defenders of the 
Land, Defenders of the Land condemns Harper government surveillance of First Nations 
(Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.defendersoftheland.org/story/312. 
79 There is no room in this article to detail these changes, differences, and the apparent 
absence of Indigenous peoples in TWAIL 1. However, for a beginning on the distinctions 
between TWAIL 1 and 2, see Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to 
International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L 
L. 77, 79–82 (2003) (boiling down five main points of TWAIL 1 and contrasting with 
TWAIL 2); ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 70, at 312; Mickelson, 
supra note 9, at 409 (drawing difference from potential Eurocentric imposition of 
nationalist historiography in earlier TWAIL); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD 
WORLD RESISTANCE 89–91 (2003) (on the Third World elite’s focus on nationalist-
legalistic change and “fetishism” of international institutions); D. Fidler, Revolt Against or 
From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of 
International Law 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29, 39–55 (2003) (on some of the grand 
initiatives of TWAIL 1 and their legacies (or lack thereof)). See generally James T. Gathii, 
TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative 
Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 (2011). 
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generation of TWAIL scholars have raised and engaged with these 
issues in their own work. A brief review of this scholarship is 
worthwhile and serves the argument for increased engagement and 
cross-pollination between different critical approaches, alternative 
histories, and authoritative sources of international law. 
The importance of the relationship between the Third World and 
Indigenous peoples has been raised to greater and lesser degrees in 
the work of Vijay Prashad, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, and Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos.80 In The Darker Nations, historian Vijay Prashad 
traces and constructs a history of the Third World as “not a place” but 
a project “longing for dignity” and the “basic necessities of life (land, 
peace, freedom)” with key leaders (Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, Castro) 
in key movements (Afro-Asian Solidarity Conferences, Non-Aligned 
Movement, Tricontinental Conference, NIEO, G-77, UNCTAD) at 
key moments (Bandung (1955), Cairo (1957, 1961, 1964), Belgrade 
(1961), Havana (1966), Algiers (1973), NIEO (1974), CERDS 
(1976), ASEAN (1977), and New Delhi (1983)).81 However, in noting 
an obituary of the Third World, Prashad points to its assassination by 
the First World through the “Trojan horse” of the 1970s debt crisis 
and IMF structural adjustment, which ensured structural poverty 
through recurring debt and eroded the “abbreviated project for the 
construction of Third World sovereignty.”82 In his conclusion, 
Prashad portrays a fragmented and pluralistic universe of actors, 
networks, and theories, listing social movements “in the darker 
nations to challenge the Neoliberal states,” such as movements for 
land, water, women’s rights, Indigenous rights, cultural dignity, and 
economic parity that “draw on resilient ideological resources (such as 
Marxism, anarchism, and populism).”83 
Prashad’s conclusions echo some of those made by law and 
development scholar Balakrishnan Rajagopal in his book, 
International Law From Below. Akin to Prashad, Rajagopal contests 
the seemingly natural classification of Third World states as low-
income or poor.84 Instead, Rajagopal notes the constructed and 
 
80 Prashad, supra note 9; Rajagopal, supra note 79; BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, 
TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC 
TRANSITION (1995). 
81 PRASHAD, supra note 9, at xv–xvi. 
82 Id. at 231. 
83 Id. at 279–80. Prashad goes on to note that “It is from these many creative initiatives 
that a genuine agenda for the future will arise. When it does, the Third World will have 
found its successor.” Id. at 281. 
84 Id. at 276. 
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maintained character of this structural inequality, such that “the 
discovery of poverty emerged as a working principle of the process 
whereby the domain of interaction between the West and the non-
West was defined.”85 This working principle harkens back to 
Anghie’s notion of the dynamic of difference that plays out 
throughout history between colonizer and colonized in still-ongoing 
civilizing missions. Akin to Prashad, Rajagopal traces a similar story 
of the “failure of Marxism as a liberatory discourse” and the shortfalls 
of statist (“etatist”) nationalism, but does so with an emphasis upon 
the multiple and varied social movements of the masses that followed 
these failures.86 Rajagopal argues that after: 
[T]he splintering of the Third World coalition in the mid-1970s, the 
containment of nationalist and class movements by the two Super 
Powers, and the genuine grass-roots disillusionment with the 
violence of the nation-building project in many Third World 
countries, new forms of popular mobilization began to emerge . . . . 
Indigenous peoples movements, fishworkers’ movements, farmers’ 
movements, and anti-globalization protests are, then, a result of the 
failure of Marxism as a coherent left doctrine.87 
In the wake of these failures and the disillusionment that followed, 
as well as the identification of the fragmented actors that might give 
shape to future agendas, how do we begin to find a successor to the 
Third World project? 
Although not a TWAIL scholar, legal sociologist Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos addresses similar questions in his book, Toward a New 
Common Sense. Among many other things, de Sousa Santos traces the 
movement of global/collectivist concepts in the global commons 
regimes: Pardo’s 1967 articulation of the common heritage of 
humankind and the Law of the Sea;88 the common heritage of 
humankind (CHM) and the Moon Treaty; the NIEO; 
telecommunications, the GSO; the Antarctic Treaty (as an elitist 
reconciliation of the CHM and the condominium); and the space age 
“overview effect” of seeing the Earth from outer space or from 
Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis of an integrated, all-encompassing 
 
85 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 79, at 108. 
86 Id. at 241. 
87 Id. at 238, 243 (emphasis added). 
88 For an excellent discussion on the common heritage of mankind, and how it cannot 
be ethically divorced from its Third World origins, see Karin Mickelson, Co-opting 
Common Heritage: Reflections on the Need for South-North Scholarship, in HUMANIZING 
OUR GLOBAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IVAN HEAD 112 (Obiora Chinedu Okafor & 
Obijiofor Aginam eds., 2003). 
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natural system.89 De Sousa Santos sees the haphazard and uneven 
career of such concepts as ultimately striving, in the paradigmatic 
transition he describes throughout his book, towards the principle of 
jus humanitatis, or “a law of and for humanity, as a whole, the law of 
a decent human condition in a nondualistic, but rather, mutualistic, 
interaction with nature” that is “grounded on the idea of 
intergenerational responsibility” and the transmission of “the world’s 
cultural and natural heritage to future generations.”90 Following from 
the gaps in mainstream and critical approaches to international law, 
and the future hopes of Rajagopal and Prashad’s post-Third World 
struggles, de Sousa Santos also raises the reality and hope of 
Indigenous peoples’ experience and mobilization.91 Specifically, he 
asks “What can we learn from the Indigenous peoples who, in a sense, 
are the South of the South?”92 As noted in the introduction to this 
article, I believe it is equally important to educate ourselves about 
some of the lessons from the “South of the North” gleaned from a 
North American Fourth World perspective and Indigenous legal 
theory and traditions. 
III 
TWAIL 3 AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
Fortunately, this focus on Indigenous peoples is not an entirely new 
one.93 Several recent pieces of scholarship written by adherents to, or 
readers of, TWAIL raise the relationship—for better or worse—to 
Indigenous peoples.94 Notably, all but one of these discussions or 
 
89 DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 80, at 365–73. 
90 Id. at 372–73. 
91 Id. at 313–27. 
92 Id. at 325. 
93 In reference to Malindo’s suggestion of the term “Fourth World” as referring to when 
“the Indian peoples come into their own,” Manuel noted the following: 
I do not think he meant that we would create nation-states like his own, but that, 
like Tanzania, the nation-state would learn to contain within itself many different 
cultures and life-ways, some highly tribal and traditional, some highly urban and 
individual. At that point the Third World will no longer need to imitate and 
compete with the European empires from which they have so recently escaped. 
MANUEL & POSLUNS, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
94 Karin Mickelson, Ibironke Odumosu & Pooja Parmar, Situating Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Inspirations, Challenges and Possibilities, 10 
INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 351 (2008); Ibironke T. Odumosu, Challenges for the (Present/) 
Future of Third World Approaches to International Law, 10 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 467 
(2008); Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International 
Law, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 89 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 
1999); Prabhakar Singh, Indian International Law: From a Colonised Apologist to a 
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asides emerge from the Americas with respect to Indigenous peoples 
in the hemisphere. The ambiguity of the relationship in some of the 
more recent writing is especially interesting here. For instance, in 
applying a TWAIL analysis to ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Seth Gordon 
claims in a footnote that “Although TWAIL, by its definition, focuses 
on the Third World, it has an expansive definition including all 
peoples marginalized by the western legal system and, thus, the nexus 
between the Third World as an entity and Indigenous peoples can be 
assumed.”95 Despite Gordon’s explanation, the nexus between the 
Third World and Indigenous peoples is a live issue that others have 
argued cannot be assumed. For instance, in his analysis of how World 
Bank development policies in Latin America further the dispossession 
of Indigenous lands and resources by transnational mining 
corporations, Gerardo Munarriz acknowledges TWAIL’s helpfulness 
in addressing neoliberal economics and human rights violations.96 
However, he also notes that Indigenous peoples are “missing” and 
should be included in TWAIL scholarship, both because they remain 
in a “colonial relationship” with international law and because they 
have emerged “as a political subjectivity within international human 
rights law.”97 In contrast to Gordon’s assumed “nexus” or Munarriz’s 
call for more inclusion between the Third World and Indigenous 
peoples, Valerie Phillips seems to argue otherwise given their 
respective searches for distinctive solutions within or beyond the 
state. As with Munarriz, she notes the still-colonized status of 
Indigenous peoples, but goes further in contrasting differences in 
goals and approaches between Indigenous peoples and the Third 
World/TWAIL. Specifically, she pits Indigenous peoples’ pre-
colonization, traditional political roles and groups (clan, village, tribe) 
and willingness “to contemplate the possible demise of the nation-
state” against TWAIL’s “nation-state ideology” and the ultimately 
 
Subaltern Protagonist, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1469223. 
95 Seth Gordon, Indigenous Rights in Modern International Law From a Critical Third 
World Perspective, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 401, 404 n.22 (2007). 
96 Gerardo J. Munarriz, Rhetoric and Reality: The World Bank Development Policies, 
Mining Corporations, and Indigenous Communities in Latin America, 10 INT’L 
COMMUNITY L. REV. 431, 435 (2008). 
97 Id. at 441–42. 
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assimilationist goals of social movements in decolonized states.98 The 
different threads discussed so far are worth summarizing below. 
Most of the writers discussed above—except for one—tend 
towards the inclusion or conflation of Indigenous peoples within the 
Third World or TWAIL. Some writers tend to a depiction of the Third 
World and Indigenous peoples as projects that happen in sequence 
(Prashad; Rajagopal). Others look at their discursive and actual 
relationship in more parallel, but still complementary, fashion (de 
Sousa Santos; Munarriz). In contrast to these approaches, Phillips 
stresses a stricter parallelism between the two, perhaps as two lines 
never destined, or desired, to meet. A third strain espouses expanded 
definitions of the Third World that incorporate Indigenous peoples, 
either automatically (Gordon) or through more concerted coalition 
building. This last approach is the one adopted by both women’s 
studies scholar Sunera Thobani and international law scholar 
Prabhakar Singh. Following a reading of Anghie’s work, and building 
upon an expanded category of Third World women that includes 
those who migrate to the West/North, Thobani argues that the 
exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the Third World category 
would be “scandalous,” and begs the question, “how do we account 
for the relationship between Third World peoples and Indigenous 
peoples?”99 Singh makes a similar argument for a revision of this gap, 
given the fact that the globe is “populated by pockets of third world in 
the first world and pockets of first world in the third world.”100 
Indeed, Singh aims for the use of “Third World” as “a new currency 
for identifying the deprived of both the North and the South” that 
transcends the nation-state and serves as “a unified category of the 
famished of both; the first and the third world.”101 Clearly, while the 
relationship between the Third and Fourth World and their projects 
 
98 Valerie Phillips, Indigenous Peoples and the Role of the Nation-State, 101 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 319, 320, 322 (2007). 
99 Sunera Thobani, Reading TWAIL in the Canadian Context: Race, Gender and 
National Formation, 10 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 421, 422 (2008). In the expansion of “Third 
World women” to encompass those who migrate from there to, e.g., North America, given 
their shared experience of migration and colonization, Thobani refers to Chandra Mohanty 
(referring to Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women 
and the Politics of Feminism, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 
1 (Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo & Lourdes Torres eds., 1991)). 
100 Singh, supra note 94, at 97. Singh’s comment on this gap in (India’s) TWAIL is 
made in the context of B.S. Chimni’s omission of tribal peoples from his “Six Tales of 
India” (referring to B.S. Chimni, Alternative Visions of Just World Order: Six Tales from 
India, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 389 (2005)). 
101 Singh, supra note 94, at 98, 102. 
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should not be either assumed or rejected outright, it is similar to 
international law in that there is no escaping from it.102 
This Article cannot and does not seek to finally resolve the political 
relationship between Third World and Indigenous peoples, or the 
discursive fusion of TWAIL and ILT or, differently again, the Third 
and Fourth World projects. So far, it has attempted to show the 
importance of the question103 and the open-endedness of its answer, 
especially in the context of critical approaches to international law 
whose allies and successes are few and far between. Despite their 
different interpretations and conclusions of the Spanish Scholastics, 
both Koskenniemi and Anghie show that the colonial encounter is 
central to understanding international law, and the wider world, 
historically and currently. It should be clear that any attempts to form 
such an understanding would be partial, at best, without addressing 
the distinctive experiences and activism of still-colonized Indigenous 
peoples. The next Part of this Article turns to an example of 
Indigenous legal activism and resistance at the “first institution of 
international law” in the moment when, simultaneously, international 
law became more than “simply a European law”104 and Canada sought 
to assert its sovereign international status, “which before 1919 had in 
no sense existed.”105 
IV 
FROM 1492 TO 1924: “THE REDMAN’S APPEAL FOR JUSTICE” 
A permanent police presence at Grand River, the replacement of the 
hereditary council by a compliant elective one, and the use of 
informers all ensured a degree of official control at the reserve 
level. On the international front, the services of the British 
 
102 In different lectures in Toronto, both Anghie and Koskenniemi have commented on 
the lack of exit from international law (the former quoting the lyrics to the Eagles’ song 
“Hotel California,” the latter likening international law to one’s parents). See also MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT, at xiv (Cambridge University Press 2005) (1989) (“there is no ‘outside-of-
law’”); ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 70, at 318 (“At the very least, I 
believe that the Third World cannot abandon international law because law now plays such 
a vital role in the public realm in the interpretation of virtually all international events.”). 
103 On this point, although in the context of inter-minority coalitions in the United 
States, see Ediberto Roman, Coalitions and Collective Memories: A Search for Common 
Ground, 58 MERCER L. REV. 637 (2007). 
104 MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 50 
(1979) (“Until the League of Nations came into being, this international law was simply a 
European law . . .”), quoted in Mickelson, supra note 9, at 406. 
105 RICHARD VEATCH, CANADA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 10 (1975). 
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diplomatic corps were effectively employed to intimidate 
governments sympathetic to the Indians.106 
Up to this point, this Article has presented both the invisibility and 
the importance of Indigenous legal traditions and Indigenous inter-
National laws to critical approaches to inter-state international law. It 
concludes with a section detailing an historical example of Indigenous 
legal activism and resistance that cuts across European inter-state 
international law, British imperial law, and Canadian domestic law, 
while exhibiting Indigenous inter-National law and legal traditions. 
Although perhaps not a famous example in Canadian history, 
international law, or TWAIL circles, the work of Levi General 
(Deskaheh) in Geneva at the League of Nations has not been ignored 
in legal scholarship, or in other scholarship that I have reviewed.107 
Most important of the original documents are: the petition written and 
circulated by Deskaheh in Geneva and elsewhere in support of 
securing a hearing at the League’s Assembly;108 the unilateral report 
commissioned by Canada and written by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew 
T. Thompson,109 on the situation at the Six Nations of Grand River at 
 
106 E. BRIAN TITLEY, A NARROW VISION: DUNCAN CAMPBELL SCOTT AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS IN CANADA 134 (1986). 
107 As noted above, Deskaheh is a hereditary chiefly title of the Younger Bear Clan of 
the Cayuga Nation (e.g., Levi General’s brother Alex assumed the title after his brother’s 
death in 1925), which forms part of the Six Nations Confederacy or Haudenosaunee 
(People of the Longhouse), whose traditional territory spans the Northeastern United 
States and across the Canadian border. Although the Council of the Confederacy split at 
the time of the American Revolutionary War, due to the separate nations allying with 
opposing sides based in part on geography and politics, it resumed shortly thereafter in 
Oshweken at the Six Nations of Grand River. Apart from being a Chief, Levi General was 
also chosen as the Speaker for the hereditary Council of the Six Nations Confederacy (and 
its deputy to London and Geneva). A succinct account of Deskaheh’s life and work is by 
Professor Donald Smith on the Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online. See Smith, 
Deskaheh (Levi General), supra note 11. Finally, although I have reviewed all of the 
documents cited below regarding Deskaheh, I have not accessed original correspondence 
between the parties contained in various archives in Geneva, Ottawa, and at Six Nations. 
For these aspects, I rely as necessary, and with references, on the several writers who have 
done so (e.g., Veatch, Woo, et al.). 
108 Deskaheh, The Redman’s Appeal for Justice (Aug. 6, 1923), available at http://law 
.lib.buffalo.edu/collections/berman/pdfs/Redmanappeal.pdf. See also SIX NATIONS, THE 
REDMAN’S APPEAL FOR JUSTICE: THE POSITION OF THE SIX NATIONS THAT THEY 
CONSTITUTE AN INDEPENDENT STATE (1924), available at http://law.lib.buffalo.edu 
/collections/berman/pdfs/Redmanappeal2.pdf); DESKAHEH, CHIEF DESKAHEH TELLS 
WHY HE IS OVER HERE AGAIN (1923). 
109 COL. ANDREW THORBURN THOMPSON, COMMISSIONER TO INVESTIGATE AND 
ENQUIRE INTO THE AFFAIRS OF THE SIX NATIONS INDIANS (Nov. 22, 1924), available at 
http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/thompson1924-eng/thomp 
son1924-eng.pdf. Thompson’s inquiry looked at several matters, including education, 
health, morality, the election of chiefs, powers assumed by Council, soldier settlement, and 
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the time; and, Canada’s belated response in the Official Journal of the 
League of Nations to Deskaheh’s appeal.110 
The next set of documents comprise the first secondary literature 
on the quest of Deskaheh and the Six Nations, with the earliest being 
a 1949 narrative historical account by Carl Carmer in the context of 
other “York State” (or New York) histories.111 A pamphlet produced 
in the 1950s by the Akwesasne Mohawk Counselor Organization (and 
later reprinted by the influential international disseminator of 
Indigenous news and views, Akwesasne Notes) sheds some additional 
light on Carmer’s account.112 Moving to later decades, the standard 
account remains a chapter in Richard Veatch’s 1975 book on Canada 
and the League of Nations.113 Important additions and context are 
provided in both Canadian domestic law and in international law 
through a series of chapters written by Douglas Sanders in the 1980s 
and 1990s.114 Apart from these accounts, there are several later 
analyses that have been made in law, anthropology, history, and 
political science, which add some further context and interpretations 
and will be discussed below as relevant.115 
 
the administration of justice. See generally Joëlle Rostkowski, The Redman’s Appeal for 
Justice: Deskaheh and the League of Nations, in INDIANS AND EUROPE: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 435 (Christian F. Feest ed., 1987). 
110 Joseph Pope, Statement Respecting the Six Nations’ Appeal to the League of 
Nations, 5 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 829 (1924). Sent from Joseph Pope, Canada’s Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, but written by Duncan Campbell Scott. See 
TITLEY, supra note 106. 
111 CARL CARMER, DARK TREES TO THE WIND: A CYCLE OF YORK STATE YEARS 
104–17 (1949). 
112 AKWESASNE NOTES, DESKAHEH: IROQUOIS STATESMAN AND PATRIOT (1976). 
113 VEATCH, supra note 105. 
114 See Douglas Sanders, The Indian Lobby, in AND NO ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT 301 (Keith Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 
1983); Douglas Sanders, Aboriginal Rights: The Search for Recognition in International 
Law, in THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 292 
(Menno Boldt, J. Anthony Long & Leroy Little Bear eds., 1985); Douglas Sanders, 
Remembering Deskaheh: Indigenous Peoples and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 485, 485–504 (Irwin Cotler & F. Peral 
Eliadis eds., 1992). 
115 Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth briefly noting one 
methodological perspective that has helped to inform the foregoing and the following 
discussion. In part of a panel discussing universality and particularity in international law, 
Outi Korhonen noted that shifting scales in international law “does not automatically cure 
us” instead, “Moving from a grand universalizing narrative to many small narratives is 
good but it is very much like moving from London to Middlemarch. The countryside may 
free us from the monolithic metropolitanism yet the smaller entity with its particularized 
circumstances and available perspectives is not necessarily more enabling, liberating, or 
equalizing. It is often equally restricted and wrought with hierarchies and misconceptions.” 
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Broadcast on the radio in Rochester, New York, on March 10, 
1925, prior to his death “in exile” in June of that year, Deskaheh’s last 
speech succinctly sets out some of the context and consequences of 
his attempt to seek standing for the Six Nations Confederacy at the 
League of Nations in Geneva. Excerpts from his speech are worth 
quoting at length here: 
About three winters ago, the Canadian Government set out to take 
mortgages on farms of our returned soldiers to secure loans made to 
them intending to use Canadian courts to enforce these mortgages in 
the name of Canadian authority within our country. When Ottawa 
tried that, our people resented it. We knew that would mean the end 
of our government. Because we did so, the Canadian Government 
began to enforce all sorts of Dominion and Provincial laws over us 
and quartered armed men among us to enforce Canadian laws and 
customs upon us. We appealed to Ottawa in the name of our right as 
a separate people and by right of our treaties, and the door was 
closed in our faces. We then went to London with our treaty and 
asked for the protection it promised and got no attention. Then we 
went to the League of Nations at Geneva with its covenant to 
protect little peoples and to enforce respect for treaties by its 
members and we spent a whole year patiently waiting but got no 
hearing. 
To punish us for trying to preserve our rights, the Canadian 
Government has now pretended to abolish our government by 
Royal Proclamation, and has pretended to set up a Canadian made 
government over us, composed of the few traitors among us who 
are willing to accept pay from Ottawa and do its bidding. 
. . . . 
This is the story of the Mohawks, the sory [sic] of the Oneidas, of 
the Cayugas—I am a Cayuga, of the Onondagas, the Senecas, and 
the Tuscaroras. They are the Iroquois. Tell it to those who have not 
been listening. Maybe I will be stopped from telling it. But if I am 
prevented from telling it over, as I hope to do, the story will not be 
lost. I have already told it to thousands of listeners in Europe—it 
has gone into the records where your children can find it when I 
may be dead or be in jail for daring to tell the truth . . . 
This story comes straight from Deskaheh, one of the chiefs of the 
Cayugas. I am the speaker of the Council of the Six Nations, the 
oldest League of Nations now existing. It was founded by 
Hiawatha. It is a League which is still alive and intends, as best it 
can, to defend the rights of the Iroquois to live under their own laws 
in their own little countries now left to them, to worship their Great 
 
See Outi Korhonen, The Role of History in International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 45, 46 (2000). 
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Spirit in their own way, and to enjoy the rights which are as surely 
theirs as the white man’s rights are his own.116 
Within these few paragraphs from his larger speech, Deskaheh 
provides some of the context for his unsuccessful appeal to the 
League of Nations. However, several additional points must be noted 
at the outset. 
First, the Six Nations’ long alliance as independent Nations with 
Great Britain, including during the war with its colonies, and the 
imperial promises of protection and compensation for any losses117 
(secured in part following Joseph Brant’s trip to England to petition 
King George III to confirm that these promises would be honored).118 
Second, the 1784 Haldimand Treaty negotiating lands for the Six 
Nations on the banks of the Grand River (near present-day Brantford, 
Ontario, and purchased by Great Britain from the Mississaugas).119 
Third, the cessions and sales of Six Nations land to the Crown, which 
used them for British settlers, and was supposed to hold the purchase 
monies in express trust for the benefit of the Six Nations, with 
accruing annual interest. However, these funds were invested and lost 
in the failed investment of the Grand River Transportation Company 
by the Government of Canada without consent of Six Nations. Fourth, 
the confirmation of freedom of movement in 1796 Jay Treat Article 
III, confirmed in 1814 Treaty of Ghent, Art. IX.120 And, finally, fifth 
being the pretensions to sovereignty by Canada due to British North 
America Act of 1867, including section 91(24) jurisdiction over 
“Indians and lands reserved for Indians” in conjunction with the 1869 
Indian Act and policies of civilization and assimilation.121 
 
116 Deskaheh, Last Speech of Deskaheh, Address on WHAM Radio in Rochester, N.Y. 
(Mar. 10, 1925), in BASIC CALL TO CONSCIOUSNESS 25–33 (Akwesasne Notes ed., 1978). 
117 See, e.g., TITLEY, supra 106, at 110–11. 
118 For some of the history behind Joseph Brant’s particular petitions in 1775 and 1785, 
see Jim Miller, Petitioning the Great White Mother: First Nations’ Organizations and 
Lobbying in London, in CANADA AND THE END OF EMPIRE 299, 301–05 (Phillip Buckner 
ed., 2004). 
119 See TITLEY, supra note 106, at 111; Darlene M. Johnston, The Quest of the Six 
Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination, 44 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 13–14 
(1986). See Scott Trevithick, Conflicting Outlooks: The Background to the 1924 Deposing 
of the Six Nations Hereditary Council (June 1998) (unpublished Master’s thesis, 
University of Calgary) (on file with author) at 44–46, for some background history to the 
land and political disputes over this land between the Mississaugas and Six Nations. 
120 See Audra Simpson, Subjects of Sovereignty: Indigeneity, The Revenue Rule and 
Juridics of Failed Consent, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191, 203-07 (2008), for a 
description of the legal and other struggles for the border. 
121 See TITLEY, supra note 106, at 112. 
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Subsequent interventions upon the sovereignty of the Six Nations 
of the Grand River included: the 1919/1920 amendments to the Indian 
Act providing for compulsory enfranchisement122 and forced removal 
of Indian status and reserve land; registration and conscription 
conducted for World War I (Deskaheh led a delegation to Ottawa to 
contest this for lack of jurisdiction and to note the 300 volunteers sent 
to fight by the Six Nations);123 the subsequent setting aside and 
mortgaging of reserve lands for both Six Nations’ and Canadian 
veterans of the First World War;124 enforcement of penal liquor laws 
and imprisonment; and the “creation of a fifth-column party through 
persuasion, promises, and payments [ . . . . it being] easier still to get 
the new minority to ask for protection.”125 Deskaheh (travelling on a 
Haudenosaunee passport) sought aid from the British Imperial 
Government following his petition in August 1921, to King George 
V, but the abrupt response by then-Colonial Secretary Winston 
Churchill in his letter to the Governor General of Canada read that as 
“the matters submitted within the petition lie within the exclusive 
competency of the Canadian Government, it should be referred to 
them.”126 
Although there was a desire to go to the Supreme Court of Canada 
on the issue of the Six Nations’ status, it was to no avail due to the 
need for leave from the Governor General’s office, which was 
deferred to a decision of the Department of Indian Affairs based on a 
negative opinion from the Department of Justice. Ongoing 
negotiations sought to achieve an impartial tribunal examining the 
question of Six Nations status/sovereignty,127 but a Canadian offer of 
June 16, 1922, for arbitration by, first, three judges from the Ontario 
Supreme Court and, later in December 1922, for Six Nations’ 
selection of any representative who was “a British subject” was 
rejected due to its bias and ploy to keep Deskaheh’s American lawyer 
 
122 Id. at 114. 
123 CARMER, supra note 111, at 106. 
124 See, e.g., Smith, Deskaheh (Levi General), supra note 11; see also Woo, supra note 
18, at 7-8. (referencing An Act to Assist Returned Soldiers in Settling Upon the Land and 
to Increase Agricultural Production, S.C. 1917, c. 21 (Can.)). 
125 CARMER, supra note 111, at 107; see also DESKAHEH: IROQUOIS STATESMAN AND 
PATRIOT, supra note 112, at 3 (suggested ploy by Indian agent, Col. Morgan, to discredit 
the community). 
126 See Sanders, Aboriginal Rights, supra note 114, at 292–304, for some of the long 
history of these imperial petitions; Keith Thor Carlson, Rethinking Dialogue and History: 
The King’s Promise and the 1906 Aboriginal Delegation to London, 16 NATIVE STUD. 
REV. 1 (2005); Miller, supra note 123, at 299–318. 
127 TITLEY, supra note 106, at 115. 
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Decker from sitting on such a panel.128 Additionally, in December 
1922, there was a raid by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) (uncoordinated with the other arm of Canadian government, 
Department of Indian Affairs)129 with arrests on the spurious pretence 
of liquor violations, including targeting Deskaheh’s home. With the 
help and advance warning of neighbors, he was able to quickly cross 
the border to Rochester, New York.130 In January 1923, the RCMP 
stationed a garrison131 (captained by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew T. 
Thompson)132 and sacred wampum belts were taken from the Council 
house.133 These actions conclusively led the Six Nations and 
Deskaheh to seek international (non-imperial) recourse in Geneva, 
with aid of Rochester lawyer George Decker,134 who had litigated 
cases in New York State for the Oneidas and other nations. 
Deskaheh and Decker had visited the Dutch charge d’affaires in 
Washington, D.C. in December 1922, to successfully request that they 
forward his petition to the League of Nations on the strength of the 
centuries old relations between Dutch settlers and the then-Five 
Nations (specifically Kanienkehaka (Mohawk) Nation). The Six 
 
128 DESKAHEH: IROQUOIS STATESMAN AND PATRIOT, supra note 117, at 2. See also 
TITLEY, supra note 106, at 118–19 (initial proposal of royal commission of three Supreme 
Court of Ontario judges (one chosen by each party and nominees selecting final judge) and 
later allowance of Six Nations representative beyond Ontario so long as British subject due 
to the lack of available Ontario judges and desire to restrict Rochester lawyer George 
Decker from nomination to the commission). 
129 See Yale D. Belanger, The Six Nations of Grand River Territory’s attempts at 
Renewing International Political Relationships, 1921–1924, 13 CAN. FOREIGN POL’Y 29, 
37 (2007). 
130 CARMER, supra note 111, at 107. 
131 Id. (“The Canadian government then ordered barracks built for the housing of their 
police and Grand River was suddenly an occupied nation.”); TITLEY, supra note 106, at 
119. 
132 Siomann Pulla, “Would You Believe That, Dr. Speck?” Frank Speck and the 
Redman’s Appeal for Justice, 55 ETHNOHISTORY 183, at 190 (2008). 
133 Id. 
134 CARMER, supra note 111, at 107. See LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, SEVEN 
GENERATIONS OF IROQUOIS LEADERSHIP: THE SIX NATIONS SINCE 1800 124 (1st ed. 
2008), for a contrast to other accounts and commentators, in which Hauptman emphasizes 
Decker’s role above others and in distinction to a portrayal of Deskaheh as, at best, naive 
in his Geneva petition. See Belanger, supra 129, at 40, for a very different perspective and 
context, which attributes a similar naivete to the Six Nations hereditary Council about the 
“innovative political philosophies” and changing international relations of the League of 
Nations at the time. Both of these criticisms by Hauptman and Belanger are somewhat 
unsatisfying because they do not seem to explain what came to pass in years after with 
international Indigenous advocacy and law nor what either Deskaheh or the Six Nations 
Council might have done differently in the circumstances had their international relations 
been more enlightened or their Geneva tactics more savvy. 
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Nations Appeal was put forward under article 17 of the League 
Covenant providing for disputes between Member States and non-
Member States (as opposed to article 1 dealing with new 
Members).135 The Appeal described their current situation as “now 
constituting a menace to international peace” and requested relief 
including: recognition of the independent right of home rule; a just 
accounting of the trust funds and interest from the Imperial 
Government and the Dominion of Canada; and, freedom of transit for 
the Six Nations across Canadian territory to and from international 
waters.136 Although it was unsuccessful in stopping him from 
circulating the petition to the Secretary General of the League 
requesting it be sent on to the League Council, the Netherlands’ 
foreign affairs minister was reminded that such interventions could be 
equally applied in the case of the Dutch and their “East Indian 
subjects.” However, the combination of Canada’s vehement denial of 
League jurisdiction and the Dutch failure to do more than forward the 
paperwork, led the League’s acting Secretary General to agree to 
“‘enterrer’ [bury] the matter” by distributing the petition to the 
Council on August 7, 1923, without any likelihood that any of its 
members would request it be added to the agenda.137 Apart from 
soliciting the League, Deskaheh was lodged at the Hotel des 
Familles138 with funds raised from home and the support of different 
international groups,139 though money remained tight and at one point 
they had to raffle a couple portraits of Deskaheh in his regalia for 
6,000 Swiss francs, which fit a larger European exoticist reception of 
Deskaheh. He tactically exploited this romanticism when lecturing 
across Europe and in the Grand Salle in his regalia for the larger 
strategy of securing League Member support and public sympathy. 
Indeed, Deskaheh and Decker waged a publicity campaign that 
 
135 VEATCH, supra note 105, at 92. 
136 See Deskaheh, The Redman’s Appeal for Justice, supra note 108, at 1, 13, 20. 
137 See VEATCH, supra note 118, at 93–94. Veatch notes that the Canadian reply by 
Joseph Pope on May 25, 1923, called the Six Nations’ claim “an absurd one.” Id. at 94. 
(British Foreign Office “formally protested the Netherlands’ role in the affair, which it 
considered ‘an uncalled for interference in internal affairs of Canada’”). 
138 CARMER, supra note 111, at 107. 
139 Sanders, supra note 114, at 298. (discussing International Bureau for the Defence of 
Indigenous Peoples (BIDI) (and Rene Claparede), the Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society of London, etc.); See also Rostkowski, supra note 109, at 446–48, for a discussion 
on the skepticism of the League of Nations Union and the Law Reform Association, as 
well as the support of BIDI, Claparede, and the coordinating efforts of the Commission 
des Iroquois. 
2012] The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches 167 
to International Law with Lessons from the Fourth World 
received much press coverage in Geneva and abroad140 and set a 
precedent for many later campaigns. 
Dated February 23, 1924, Canada’s official reply argued (among 
other things) that: 
• the Six Nations was not a state competent to apply within art. 17 
of the League’s Covenant; 
• the Six Nations were subjects of the British Crown and not self-
governing peoples nor recognized as such; 
• the Nov. 30, 1890, Order-in-Council recognized their loyalty but 
noted they had no special exemption from the effect of the laws 
of the land (confirmed in 1921 in response to the Six Nations’ 
request to refer the question of their status to the Supreme Court 
of Canada); 
• discussing treaties with the Six Nations would be akin to “talk of 
making a treaty of alliance with the Jews in Duke Street or with 
the French emigrants who have settled in England.” (citing 
Justice Riddell quoting then-Attorney General, and later Chief 
Justice, John Beverley Robinson); 
• the Six Nations had natural born allegiance due to their birth 
within the Crown’s dominions (citing Blackstone); 
• the 1919 Indian Act enfranchisement sections provided for 
Indian acquisition of full Canadian citizenship and the chance to 
“stimulate progress among the Indians and to afford them an 
opportunity for self-development and advancement”; 
• the Six Nations had “in no way conducted or maintained any 
separate courts or legal machinery of their own”; 
• there had been no misappropriation or waste of large sums of Six 
Nations’ trust funds; 
• that hereditary Council’s method of selecting chiefs was a 
“primitive matriarchal form where the oldest women of the clans 
hold voting power”; and, 
• that recognition of the independent or sovereign status of Indians 
in treaties of cession, not used by the Dominion of Canada in the 
international law sense, would mean “the entire Dominion would 
be dotted with independent or quasi-independent Indian States 
 
140 CARMER, supra note 111, at 109–10; VEATCH, supra note 105, at 95; see Carlson, 
supra note 126, at 15. (On the risk of becoming “an entertainment item rather than news” 
in the context of a different petition); see also Sanders, supra note 114, at 293, 296. (On 
the romanticism and “special status” of Indigenous peoples in European eyes, as well as 
Indigenous strategies of publicity and embarrassment beyond the nation state). 
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‘allied with but not subject to the British Crown’ [. . .] such a 
condition would be untenable and inconceivable.”141 
Of course, it had been Canada’s longstanding desire, along with a 
minority of Six Nations Christian Reformers in Grand River Country, 
to install an elected Band Council government to displace the 
hereditary Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council favoured by the 
majority of Traditionalists (adherents of the Longhouse religion). This 
desire was given effect by the boycotted, one-sided, and biased 
Thompson Commission’s recommendation, among others, to install 
an elected council as soon as possible (appointed Mar. 1923, heard 
witnesses Sept. 1923, submitted report Nov. 1923, and circulated to 
the League of Nations in Feb. 1924).142 Thompson’s inquiry looked at 
several matters, including education, health, morality, the election of 
chiefs, powers assumed by the Council, soldier settlement, and the 
administration of justice. In his discussion on the election of chiefs, 
Thompson criticized what he saw as a superficial matriarchal role in 
the selection of Chiefs and preferred instead, in combination with the 
 
141 See Statement of Government of Canada respecting the “Appeal of the ‘Six Nations’ 
to the League” (June 1924) 5 League of Nations Official Journal 829 [Dec. 27, 1923]. Sent 
from Joseph Pope, Canada’s Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs but written by 
Duncan Campbell Scott; TITLEY, supra note 106, at 122; see Beverley Jacobs, 
International Law/The Great Law of Peace, (Spring 2000) (unpublished Master’s Thesis, 
University of Saskatchewan) (on file with the University of Saskatchewan College of Law 
Library), for a rebuttal on this last point concerning the meaning of treaty and the sources 
of the law; see P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Andrew F. Cooper, The Achilles heel of 
Canadian International Citizenship: Indigenous Diplomacies and State Responses, 13 
CAN. FOREIGN POL’Y J. 99, at 100, 112 (2007). For a discussion on the abiding fear of a 
Dominion dotted with quasi-independent allies, and the spectre of Quebec, see Johnston, 
supra note 47, at 30. 
142 THOMPSON, supra note 109. For some of the many important criticisms of this 
flawed Commission, see Siomonn Pulla, “Would You Believe That, Dr. Speck?” Frank 
Speck and the Redman’s Appeal for Justice, 55 ETHNOHISTORY 183, 190, 193–94 (2008) 
(outlining Speck’s criticisms of Thompson’s report, including his objection to the shut 
down of the longhouse, which was also an “important place of worship” and Thompson’s 
misrepresentation of the acceptance of traditional government, in which 80 percent of 
community members participated (Thompson was also the head of the Grand River RCMP 
detachment)); Johnston, supra note 47, at 9 (on the unique role of women as titleholders 
and nominators of chiefs); id. at 19 (a community faction of acculturated abolitionists, the 
Royal Commission was to investigate a situation led by Thompson, “who had commanded 
several of the Six Nations men during the First World War,” from whom a group of 
veterans (Warriors Association members) “incited the campaign for an elective system” 
through a “deeply inadequate” and one-sided approach by Thompson, which “relied on 
oral testimony from witnesses and his personal observations,” without any historical or 
legal context and also lacked the appearance of most chiefs “in keeping with their non-
recognition of Canadian jurisdiction”); id. at 20 (the non-participation of the chiefs in the 
Thompson Commission was mirrored in the first election where the majority of the 
community refused to vote). 
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limited witnesses he heard from, an elective system as soon as 
possible.143 Thompson notes his conviction of corruption at the 
Council of Chiefs: “I am fully convinced that the present Council has 
undoubtedly been guilty of a serious usurpation of power, with regard 
to the Government of Canada on the one hand, and the people of the 
Six Nations Indians on the other, and that for a considerable time they 
have been acting very much as a law unto themselves.”144 Given 
reports that he was in command of the RCMP detachment at the 
Grand River, it perhaps comes as no surprise that Thompson’s 
comment on the issue was simply that, “In this connection I wish to 
state that these men have carried out their duties with admirable tact 
and prudence, and seem to have aroused no feeling of personal 
animosity whatever. Their presence on the reserve, however, is 
deplored, not resented, by the law-abiding Indians, who constitute a 
vast majority of the population, for they feel that it stamps them in the 
eyes of the white community as a lawless people.”145 Nowhere in 
these comments is there recognition of sources of authoritative law 
within the community itself. Interestingly, on the issue of the Six 
Nations trust funds that were invested without approval in the Grand 
River Navigation Company for a total loss and without compensation 
(in addition to both the Canadian and Imperial governments 
disclaiming liability), Thompson recommended that it be dealt with 
because he found it convincing and, according to one witness, it 
“shakes their confidence in British justice.”146 
Unfortunately, and as noted above, the appeal of Deskaheh and the 
Six Nations was ultimately unsuccessful for a number of reasons. 
First, the lack of support from the Dutch beyond initial circulation of 
the petition did not help. Second, though Panama, Estonia, Ireland, 
and Persia were initially supportive and penned a letter on September 
27, 1923, requesting the Six Nations question be put to the Permanent 
 
143 THOMPSON, supra note 109, at 11, 14. Note that Thompson recommended that men 
have the franchise, but not women. Id. at 12. 
144 Id. at 14. 
145 Id. at 16; see also Pulla, supra note 132, at 190. 
146 THOMPSON, supra note 109, at 19. Interestingly, apart from acknowledging the 
reality of this merely pecuniary interest, Thompson also recommended negotiation 
between the Canadian and Imperial governments for the purpose of appointing a reputed 
jurist from a foreign country to determine the matter. Id. While the Canadian and Imperial 
governments could benefit in theory from an at least facially objective adjudication of their 
dispute of the liability for these mismanaged funds, Deskaheh and the Six Nations’ desire 
for such impartial international arbitration (beyond the bounds of British subjects) was not 
entertained by the Department of Indian Affairs. See TITLEY, supra note 106, at 119. 
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Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion,147 they were 
ultimately pressured by the British Foreign Office to stop their 
“impertinent interference.”148 All of the Six Nations’ attempts were 
further burdened by the Canadian desire for a more independent 
presence on the international stage and the largely unhelpful League 
bureaucracy (in part staffed or formerly staffed by Canadians 
knowledgeable of its intricacies, as well as some not exactly neutral 
Europeans).149 On September 17, 1924, a further obstacle arose in the 
Order-in-Council mandating an elected band council pursuant to the 
Indian Act. On October 7, 1924, the Haudenosaunee hereditary 
Council was deposed and “free elections” were held, under the Indian 
Act, armed guard, and the dark cloud of a large boycott of the 
proceedings at Six Nations where less than 30 ballots were cast on 
October 21, 1924, with a significant benefit to the Canadian 
government from this coup being its interpretation that Deskaheh had 
“no authority to speak” for his community any longer.150 
 
147 There are competing narratives about the rationales of support in the letters of these 
former colonies. While some accounts emphasize a natural solidarity of small nations 
between them and the Six Nations, e.g., TITLEY, supra note 106, at 123, Veatch notes the 
fact that, “three of the four signers (the delegates of Panama, Persia, and Estonia) had, only 
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Assembly approval of its Article 10 interpretative resolution.” VEATCH, supra note 105, at 
95 (footnote omitted). See also THOMPSON, supra note 109, at 99. 
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security guarantee of article 10 of the League’s Covenant, as well as equality for the rights 
of immigrant workers, see id. (explaining Canadian attempts to delete, then amend, then 
restrict through an interpretive clause, Veatch cites Department of External Affairs papers 
stating, “‘Our primary concern was with Article 10, “the heart of the Covenant,” as 
President Wilson called it, but a heart which from the beginning we would have been glad 
to see stop beating.’” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). See also, id. at 8 (discussing 
the revision of the interpretive clause requiring the same treatment for foreign workers as 
for nationals, to having “due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers” 
given “restrictions on Oriental labour in effect in the provinces of British Columbia and 
Saskatchewan”). On the bureaucratic animus towards the Six Nations cause, see id. at 99, 
n.110. 
150 CARMER, supra note 111, at 110–11; Woo, supra note 18, at 8; see also TITLEY, 
supra note 111, at 132 (regarding the lack of evidence of majority support for the elective 
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Ultimately, the denial by the League, Great Britain, and Canada, 
led Deskaheh to rent the Salle Centrale and present the Six Nations’ 
case to the enthusiastic public, leading Carmer to write that, in 
addition to the press, “All the Geneva Boy Scouts were present, but 
not a single League of Nations official.”151 Deskaheh had to return to 
the U.S., as he was considered a criminal in Canada, and took refuge 
with Tuscarora chief Clinton Rickard near Rochester, New York, 
until his death in June 1925.152 
CONCLUSION 
What are the implications of the struggle of Deskaheh and the Six 
Nations at the League of Nations and beyond? The argument in this 
article has been that international law, and especially critical 
approaches to international law as developed by Martti Koskenniemi, 
Antony Anghie, TWAIL and others, cannot ignore the experiences of 
Indigenous peoples within international law. Even further, this article 
has argued that critical approaches to international law, whether in 
search of a thicker, decolonized and anti-imperial international law, or 
a thinner, formalist defense of political and economic sovereignty and 
self-determination, cannot ignore their relationship to Indigenous 
peoples. Deskaheh’s story shows the complexity of Indigenous 
peoples’ relationship to international law, which registers at multiple 
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action, see Scott Trevithick, Conflicting Outlooks: The Background to the 1924 Deposing 
of the Six Nations Hereditary Council 107, 116 (June, 1998) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, 
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/bitstream/1880/26128/1/34920Trevithick.pdf (addressing a confluence of factors having 
to do with the DIA desire for an elected council, international embarrassment from 
Deskaheh’s actions, and local fractures between majority Traditionalists in control of 
council and minority Reformers). On the “distinct religious worlds” within the historical 
community between Protestant Christians and Longhouse traditionalists, see Smith, supra 
note 17. 
151 CARMER, supra note 111, at 112. 
152 Id. at 114–15. Note that the Six Nations did not stop their attempts to draw 
international attention to questions of their sovereignty and self-determination. See 
Johnston, supra note 47, at 23 (discussing 1945 submissions to United Nations 
representatives in San Francisco). See also Sanders, Remembering Deskaheh, supra note 
114, at 487 et seq. (describing the Six Nations delegation to the UN in 1945, the ILO 
Convention of 1957, and 1960’s extension of the vote by Diefenbaker to Canadian Indians 
in part to stymy embarrassing comparisons between Canada and the South African 
apartheid). See generally Sanders, Aboriginal Rights, supra note 119. 
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scales and defies any easy distinctions between public, private, 
national, domestic, foreign, and international. It also shows the 
myriad forces arrayed at every level against the continued assertions 
of Indigenous peoples to determine their own lives and secure their 
own distinctive futures as free as possible from outside coercion. 
Nonetheless, it can be seen as a hopeful story for several reasons, 
some of which are relevant to my discussion here about the need for 
mutual learning between critical approaches to international law. 
First, playing on the historical insights and convictions of 
Koskenniemi and Anghie, it should be clear now that there is nothing 
outside of international law’s colonial constitution, and thus no 
escaping from international law’s relationship with Indigenous 
peoples.153 
Second, from the work of Deskaheh and others in the decades to 
follow, culminating most recently perhaps in the belated 
endorsement(s) by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
States (CANZUS) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples,154 Indigenous peoples have not been passive objects or 
victims within this narrative. 
Third, if the spectrum of participants at international law is 
widened to include Indigenous peoples and poor migrants, potentially 
both the Fourth and Third Worlds, then the possibility for effective 
action and resistance, including material gains on the ground, should 
increase. Critical theories and actors in international law will do a 
better job of describing the world they seek to both change and 
explain if they work to appreciate the struggles of others grappling 
with a commonly denominated and disdainful state sovereignty that 
puts international migrants, Indigenous peoples, and others within the 
same nexus. As noted by Anghie, it will take insights from all cultures 
to realize an anti-imperial international law.155 Citing Wallerstein, 
Chimni usefully expands on this call for pluralism by adding that 
 
153 However fraught and contested the means and goals were and remain. For a 
discussion of the competing legacies and implications of Deskaheh, see generally 
Rostkowski, supra note 109; Woo, supra note 12; Belanger, supra note 129; Trevithick, 
supra note 119; Ronald Niezen, Recognizing Indigenism: Canadian Unity and the 
International Movement of Indigenous Peoples, 42 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 119 
(2000). 
154 CANZUS = Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. On optimism, 
see Henderson, supra note 8 (regarding UNDRIP) But cf., e.g., Patrick Macklem, 
Indigenous Recognition in International Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 177 (2008); Sheryl 
Lightfoot, Selective Endorsement Without Intent to Implement: Indigenous Rights and the 
Anglosphere, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 100 (2012). 
155 ANGHIE, supra note 14, at 319–20. 
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what is specifically needed are the stories of resistance that dialogue 
between old and new social movements, that are made integral to a 
theory of resistance to international law, that navigate between liberal 
optimism and left pessimism, and that strike alliances with other 
critics of neoliberal approaches to international law by getting to 
know and understand each other’s stories, struggles, and strategies.156 
Fourth, by expanding the scope of participants in and against 
international law, it is also possible to expand the scope of relevant 
and applicable laws and sources of law, as seen in decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the Inter-American Commission and Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and, most importantly here, 
Indigenous legal traditions and inter-National laws.157 Consequently, 
if Koskenniemi’s insight that the true legacy of the Spanish 
Scholastics remains their prophecy of centralized states, citizens laden 
with the expectation of absolute loyalty, a global economic system of 
profit and private ownership, and continuous warfare,158 then it is 
important to understand the histories and current articulations of these 
laws and legal traditions for both reasons of solidarity and resistance. 
This resistance can come in many forms, including: letter writing, 
boycotts, the exercise of local jurisdiction, the making or renewal of 
inter-state and inter-National diplomatic ties, international petitions, 
the politics of embarrassment, naming and shaming, passive 
resistance, strategic litigation, occupations, blockades, and reclaiming 
and practicing one’s languages and laws.159 Of course, it will not 
likely come in the form of a law review article.160 But efforts like 
 
156 B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L 
CMTY. L. REV. 3, 17–24 (2006). In a domestic context, see Roman, supra note 103 
(assessing the pros and cons through Critical Race Theory and LatCrit literature, but 
ultimately weighing in favour of interminority coalitions). 
157 See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.); Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicar., Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153 (Aug. 
31, 2001). See also discussion supra Section 2 on John Borrows, Mi’kmaq, and 
Anishinabek laws. 
158 Koskenniemi, supra note 44, at 12. 
159 On this last point, see, e.g., Chinkin, Wright, & Charlesworth, supra note 35, at 32–
44 (detailing Wright’s work as Northern Director of Akitsiraq Law School in Iqaluit, 
Nunavut, in charge of a program of transnational Indigenous legal education in Inuit, 
Canadian, and international law, responsive to the Inuit context and needs of women 
(comprising the majority of students) and including required learning of the Inuktitut 
language).  See also the important work undertaken in Anishinaabe law and education at 
Shingwauk Kinoomaage Gamig, available at http://www.algomau.ca/about-algoma-u 
/shingwauk-kinoomaage-gamig. 
160 For an extended polemic on this point, albeit made in a law review, in the context of 
radical and Marxist approaches to international law (also criticizing Chimni), see Bill 
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those made in this article might be of assistance in highlighting the 
means for connecting sometimes disparate critical projects together, 
through mutual education of alternative sources of law to govern 
relationships to the original sources of all wealth: the land and one 
another.161 A potential starting list of such doctrines and sources could 
include: the Common Heritage of Mankind;162 Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources;163 the New International Economic Order;164 
Indigenous ownership and jurisdiction over the land,165 or at least, 
commonly held, inalienable Aboriginal title whose source preexists 
the Crown/State;166 the Bowl with One Spoon;167 and the Seventh 
Generation teaching.168 These are all examples of what might truly be 
called International Law and a grounded critical approach to its 
practice, theory, and teaching in today’s world.169 
 
Bowring, What is Radical in “Radical International Law”?, FIN. Y.B. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982159. 
161 This is a slight modification of KARL MARX, DAS CAPITAL vol. 1 (1867), which 
claims the original sources of all wealth are the worker and the soil; see also Brett Clark & 
John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology in the Twenty-First Century, 1:1 WORLD REV. POL. 
ECON. 142, 150–52 (2010). On a related point, see Lillian Aponte Miranda, Indigenous 
Peoples as International Lawmakers, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 203, 259–60, 263 (2010) 
(discussing potential coalitions of marginalized groups and populations and the need to go 
beyond human rights discourse to address the just allocation of scarce resources like land 
and natural resources). 
162 See generally Mickelson, supra note 9. 
163 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 79; Chimni, A Manifesto, supra note 156. 
164 Anghie & Chimni, supra note 79; Fidler, supra note 79. 
165 See Mariana Valverde, “The Honour of the Crown is at Stake”: Aboriginal Land 
Claims Litigation and the Epistemology of Sovereignty, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 955, 972 
(2011) (noting the change in the original pleadings in the Delgamuukw case from 
“ownership and jurisdiction” to the lesser “aboriginal title”). 
166 See, e.g., Leena Heinamaki, Inherent Rights of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: 
Reflections of the Debate in National and International Law, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 
155 (2006). 
167 See Simpson, supra note 60. For an articulation of similar principles concerned with 
the sharing of territory and resources from different legal traditions, see generally PETER 
LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO: LIBERTIES AND COMMONS FOR ALL 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) at Ch. 11, “The Constitution of the 
Commons.” For a different, crucially nuanced take on the issue of competing colonial and 
Indigenous commons, see Allan Greer, Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of 
North America, AM. HIST. REV. 365 (Apr. 2012). 
168 ALFRED, supra note 48; Borrows, supra note 51. See also Oren Lyons, Indian Self-
Government in the Haudenosaunee Constitution, 55 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 117 (1986). 
169 For example, see the ongoing situation of the Algonquins of Barriere Lake, their 
negotiated but unimplemented Trilateral Agreement, the imposition of § 74 of the Indian 
Act installing an elected band council (in which only 26 people voted) and deposing their 
traditional government. Barriere Lake Solidarity, Algonquins of Barriere Lake vs Section 
74 of the Indian Act, VIMEO, http://vimeo.com/23103527. See also S. Pasternak (work in 
progress); On current issues in the community Deskaheh was exiled from after his efforts, 
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